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Abstract 
The Swiss private banking industry has been always known as one of the leading off-
shore private banking centers. During the last five years, however, the market entered a phase of 
fundamental change. Global economic downturn has notably harmed the industry and the natural 
recovery was further depressed with the new regulations coming into force. This thesis is an 
empirical study of the System Dynamics methodology applied to analyze the Swiss private 
banking industry in its transition phase.   
The aim of this thesis is to develop a System Dynamics model that can act as a helpful 
tool for identifying important structural changes in the industry and assisting in developing 
industry forecasts. First, this paper provides a review of the relevant literature that proves the 
adequacy of the chosen methodology for the Swiss private banking case. Then, a detailed 
description of the development of the industry over time is presented, followed by the hypothesis 
that suggests that the behavior of the industry has been largely driven by the external factors and 
the “not-so-invisible-hand” represented by the new regulations. The last section of thesis is 
devoted to the analysis of the market in the short-midterm future under various scenarios.  
The results of the study demonstrate that policies that are being implemented by private 
banks, directed at cost reduction, are effective only to a very limited extent. It is suggested that 
only by combining operational efficiency and cutting costs with improved overall service and 
product quality, Swiss private banks will be able to achieve the positive trend in the profitability 
of the industry in a midterm future.  
The key contribution of this work includes a model that captures the private banking 
industry in a structured systemic way that includes time delays, feedback cycles, nonlinearities, 
and stocks and flows. The conclusive added value of this model is its ability to forecast the 
development of key industry indicators under various scenarios. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and motivation 
In the dynamic world of today constant building and reviewing business strategies is 
essential for successful operation of any business. Assumptions about future demand are crucial 
for making right business decisions. Companies operating in the fast-pace changing environment 
have a constant need for scanning industries where they perform. This usually implies not only 
measuring how an industry performed or will perform, but also understanding underlying forces 
that shape a market.  
For manufacturing firms, knowledge about a market helps to make production planning 
decisions or plan how much financing will be needed in one or another department in the future. 
For private banks, knowledge about the market environment can help to define which strategic 
option to choose (whether to continue the present activities on the stand-alone basis, create a 
joint venture with another bank or even consider exiting the market), how to position themselves 
in lights of the changing environment and which policies to implement in order to sustain their 
businesses.  
 This paper describes a process and outcomes of a three-month system dynamics project 
directed to the analysis of structural changes of the private banking industry in Switzerland. 
Swiss private banking industry has been always known as one of the leading off-shore private 
banking centers. However, since the last five years the market entered a phase of fundamental 
change. Global economic downturn has notably harmed the industry and the natural recovery 
was further depressed with the new regulations coming into force. Patrick Odier, the chairman of 
the Swiss Bankers Association, starts the annual 2011/2012 banking report with the following 
words (Swiss Banking Annual Report, 2012a, p.4):  
“In this special centenary year for the Swiss Bankers Association, there is no doubt that 
our financial centre has rarely faced so many challenges. The situation reminds me of a 
motorway with road works everywhere: no sooner is one finished than another begins”. 
Dynamic changes in the market environment bring new challenges for the market 
players
1
 and require decision makers to adjust their market strategies. The author of this paper 
hopes that system dynamics approach to the Swiss private banking problem will help the market 
                                                 
1
 Market player in this report is used to refer to a private bank or a decision maker in a private bank.  
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players to make optimal business decisions in light of the changing environment and to 
implement policies which will help to sustain their businesses.  
1.2 Client and its motivation 
The research described in this paper was written in partnership with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in Zurich, Switzerland. PricewaterhouseCoopers is a 
multinational company which provides various consultancy and auditing services. PwC is the 
largest of the Big Four
2
 accounting firms measured by revenues in (PwC Annual report, 2012a). 
The company has three main service lines: advisory, tax advisory and assurance services. All 
service lines in one or another way provide service for private banks in either process consulting, 
tax advisory or auditing form. Private Banks are important clients for PwC and therefore, it is 
crucial for PwC experts to have comprehensive understanding of the situation in the industry.  
1.3 Previous works  
Various methods are being used for market research. Both qualitative and statistical 
analyses are frequently employed by companies and market research agencies. System dynamics 
(SD) has been applied to research various markets from its early days and, therefore, was 
considered to be adequate for researching the Swiss private banking industry. Forrster (1961), 
Goodman (1989) and Richardson and Pugh (1981) studied how system dynamics can be applied 
for market analysis and strategy design. 
 Lynneis (2000) names three arguments for how the proper use of system dynamics 
models for market forecasting and structural analyses can add value to the clients. Firstly, system 
dynamics models may generate more reliable forecasts of short- to -mid term trends than 
statistical models may do and, therefore, lead to better decisions. Secondly, SD models explain 
the causes of market behavior and define changes in industry structure. Last but not least, system 
dynamics models allow for the determination and testing of market forecasts under various 
scenarios to give inputs to strategic decisions and policies.  
Over the last decade, various industries have been analyzed using the system dynamics 
approach. Eskinasi, Rouwette and Vennix (2011) analyzed the dynamics of the Dutch housing 
market. Liehr, Grossler, Kleinb and Milling (2001) modeled business cycles in the airline 
                                                 
2
 Big Four refers to four largest international professional services networks in accountancy and other professional 
services handling the majority of audits for public and private companies.   
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market. Ghaffarzadegan and Tajrishi (2010) used system dynamics methodology to analyze the 
economic transition management in a commodity market using the case of the Iranian cement 
industry. 
This research focuses on the analysis of the private banking industry in Switzerland. As 
far as the author of this paper is aware, this type of the market has not been researched using the 
system dynamics approach previously. However, certain knowledge can be taken from previous 
researches on the mentioned industries and from May and Arinaminpathy (2009) who used the 
system dynamics method to research the banking systems.  
1.4  Research objective  
The research objective of the study was to develop a model which can act as a helpful tool 
for market players to identify important structural changes in the industry over the period of 
2006-2011 and to help them make informed business decisions based on the market forecasts for 
2012-2018. 
The thesis aimed at answering the following research questions: 
1. Which forces are driving the industry behavior? 
2. What is the effect of new regulations on Swiss private banking?  
a. How the new regulations effect the revenue side of the industry? 
b. How the new regulations effect the cost side of the industry? 
3. How do policies that market players are employing effect the market?  
4. Which policies may help Swiss private banks to increase their profitability?  
1.5 Outline of the thesis  
The report outline reflects the chronological order in which this research was conducted. 
The first chapter provides an introduction to the research and explains the relevance of the topic 
for the client and gives a brief introduction to the problem. In addition, the author reviews 
relevant literature and defines the research objective and research questions. The second chapter 
is dedicated to explaining the research methodology and introducing the reader to the key 
concepts of the research. Chapter three gives a detailed description of the problem by first 
describing how the private banking market has developed on a global level and then, presenting 
how key concepts of Swiss private banking evolved throughout the historic period. Chapter four 
4 
 
gives a description of the model and explains step by step how the model was built. Chapter five 
presents the analysis of the model and explains the model validation process. Simulation results 
are also presented in this chapter. Chapter six is devoted to the analysis of the market in the 
short-midterm future under various scenarios and provides suggestions for possible policies. The 
last chapter includes the interpretation of the results, the contribution of this study, managerial 
implications, limitations and directions for further research.  
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2 Chapter 2: Research methodology  
2.1 Research approach 
To understand the processes and forces driving Swiss private banking market behavior a 
detailed analysis of the context is essential. The study of the private banking industry requires 
analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data. A case study is defined as “a research strategy 
which involves the investigation of a particular contemporary topic within its real-life context, 
using multiple sources of evidence” (Saunders & Lewis, 2012, p. 116). A case study should be 
used when a detailed understanding of the context is needed and, therefore, was considered to be 
the best approach for this research.  
2.1.1 Process and data collection 
The diagram shown in Figure 1 represents the process of the research applied in this 
paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research process 
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Desk research: the main goal of the desk research was to gather all the information 
needed for developing an SD model from the published sources so as to lay the groundwork for 
interviews with market players and industry experts. Three types of sources were used in the 
desk research: industry related sources, SD literature, and banking related literature. First, 
relevant SD literature was reviewed in order to prove the adequacy of the methodology for the 
private banking case. Reviewing the previous studies conducted using the SD approach to 
investigate markets brought certain knowledge about possible structure for parts of the model 
(e.g. HR, financial structure, competition). The need to understand how private banking operates 
also required reviewing various text books on the investment banking, private banking and 
wealth management. The final and the most time consuming step was reviewing various industry 
related papers, national and international press, published and unpublished private banking 
studies. Desk research brought an initial understanding of how private banking market operates 
and provided a starting point for the preliminary model.  
Trade research: The main objective of the trade research was to engage in conversation 
with trade sources (market players and external industry experts
3
) in order to fill the knowledge 
gap and obtain confirming information about the structure of the model.  
Interviews: First, representatives of private banks were interviewed. Discussions with 
market players helped to fill gaps in available published data and evaluate the market players’ 
views on forces driving the market behavior. Knowledge received during those interviews was 
used to build a preliminary model.  Later, several interviews were conducted with external 
experts. External private banking experts were interviewed in order to obtain confirmation on the 
estimations provided by market players and enhance an overall understanding of the private 
banking structure. 
Workshops: When the preliminary model had been developed, several group modeling 
workshops took place. The system dynamics literature has highlighted the value of directly 
involving many participants in the modeling process (Rouwette, Vennix & van Mullekom, 2002). 
The goal of the workshops was to either obtain confirmation or identify the need for adjustment in 
the structure of the preliminary model so that it would represent the situation in the industry in 
coherent and consistent way. Two workshops took place: the first one aimed at validating the causal 
loop structure and the second at validating the stock and flow structure.  
                                                 
3
 External experts  in this report refers to private banking experts in PwC 
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After the model had been developed, adjusted and discussed with external industry experts, 
model validation tests were conducted. The main goal of the model validation was to demonstrate the 
system’s ability to recreate the real situation of Swiss private banking. The final step in the research 
process was developing and testing policies.   
2.1.2 Research sample 
The research described in this paper was conducted using a snowball sampling in which 
every subsequent member of the sample is identified by the earlier sample members (Saunders & 
Lewis, 2012). All the interview members and participants of the workshop were selected with the 
help of the partner company. In the literature, a person who “helps to select appropriate people 
within the organization with whom to work before the workshop, works with the modeling team 
to plan those pre-workshop meetings, schedules them, and participates in them” is called a 
gatekeeper (Andersen & Richardson, 1997, p. 109). In this research Joerg Gerigk – a PwC 
representative and an external thesis advisor – acted as a gatekeeper. With his help, the right 
people, both the external industry experts and the market players, were selected for the 
interviews and modeling workshops. The interviewee list included the followings: 
 Chief Executive Officer of the Private Bank 14 
 Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Private Bank 2 
 Strategic Platform Developer of the Integrated Global Bank 
 Senior Manager - Audit Financial Services – External expert 
 Financial Services Consultant – External expert 
 Head Corporate Finance Financial Services – External expert 
 Head of Private Banking – External expert 
2.1.3 Market research sources 
One of the added values that system dynamics approach can provide is a holistic view of 
the problem. For developing a comprehensive and coherent representation of Swiss private 
banking industry this study required collecting data from various sources. Figure 2 shows the list 
of key sources which were used to research the market.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 The names of the participants are not disclosed.  
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Official sources: Swiss National Bank 
  Swiss Bankers Association 
  Swiss Federal Office 
Studies: 
The end of a Golden Age? 
PwC Private Banking Study 
  
Helvea: Swiss banking secrecy and taxation. 
 Paradise lost?   
  Capgemini: World Wealth Report 2012 
  
University of Zurich: The International Private 
Banking Study 2011 
  
Banking in transition – future 
prospects for banking in Switzerland 2011. 
A joint study by the Swiss Bankers Association 
and The Boston 
Consulting Group on the Swiss banking centre 
  
McKinsey Private Banking Survey 2012 
Finding a new footing 
  
Switzerland – The Future of HNWIs to 2016: 
Opportunities for Wealth Sector Professionals 
  
KPMG Performance through focus. 
Seizing the global private banking opportunity 
Trade Press:  OANDA 
  
Swissinfo.ch - International Service of the Swiss 
Broadcasting Corporation 
Table 1: Market sources 
2.1.4 Data sample  
Private Banks are defined as any financial institution or unit within a larger financial 
institution whose main source of business comes from individuals with at least USD 1 million to 
invest (McKinsey & Company, 2012). There were 161 institutions
5
 at the end of 2011 
specializing in stock exchange, securities and private banking services (Swiss National Bank, 
2011).  
The PwC Private banking study (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLC [PwC], 2013) was the 
main data source used in the SD model. The PwC private banking study (2013) is based on the 
2006 through 2011 annual financial statements of 100 institutions active in the Swiss private 
                                                 
5
 For calculating the total number of private banks, the sum of Foreign-controlled Banks, Commercial Banks and 
Other Banking Institutions was used. Most banks included in these categories can be regarded as Private Banks.  
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banking sector. The two big banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, and their private banking activities 
were included in the benchmarking group of the PwC study. According to the authors of the 
study, the sample of 100 of the total 161 private banks may be considered representative.  
Other sources (listed in Table 1) and interviews with market players and industry experts 
were used to find the data not available from the PwC study. Where applicable the average 
parameters for the industry were used (e.g. if the data for the industry states that the average time 
for a front staff to stay in banking is 8 years, it is considered that the same is true for the average 
in the sample). 
2.2 Key terms and definitions 
Assets under Management (AuM) – assets under management comprise all invested assets held 
under a discretionary or advisory asset management mandate. The following positions are 
regarded as assets under management: securities held in client portfolios, fiduciary deposits, 
amounts due to clients in savings and investment accounts, as well as other amounts due to 
clients from time deposits (Swiss Bankers Association, 2012).  
Cost Income Ratio (CIR) – is a ratio of total costs to total income for the year. CIR measures 
the strategic driver of cost effectiveness in the banking business. It indicates how much of total 
income is being employed to meet the cost base.  
High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) – individuals with investable assets of USD1 million or 
larger.  
Net new money (NNM) – is the net amount of AuM brought by new or existing clients over a 
year less client assets withdrawn. Interest and dividend income as well as market and currency 
movements on client assets are excluded from net new money results (Swiss Bankers 
Association, 2009b).  
Off-shore clients – Swiss private banking clients not domiciled in Switzerland (as oppose to on-
shore clients – Swiss private banking clients domiciled in Switzerland). 
Private Banking (PB) – servicing of High Net Worth Individuals. In this report private banking 
is used interchangeably with the term “Wealth Management (WM)”.  
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Private Banks – are defined as any financial institution or unit within a larger financial 
institution whose main source of business comes from individuals with at least USD1 million to 
invest.   
Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (UHNWI) – individuals with investable assets of USD30 
million or larger.   
Wealth – refers to financial assets of High Net Worth Individuals, excluding pension assets.  
Withholding tax – a tax levied on income from securities owned by a non-resident. 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
The final model which will be more thoroughly described in Chapter Three follows the 
simplified framework illustrated in Figure 2. This framework defines that assets under 
management held in the private banks are of two types – on-shore assets (assets brought by 
clients domiciled in Switzerland) and off-shore assets (assets brought by clients not domiciled in 
Switzerland). In the meanwhile off-shore assets can also be divided into two groups – assets 
declared and not declared to tax authorities. A small arrow in between declared and non-declared 
assets represents the flow of the assets from being undeclared to being declared. The value 
change of assets is being influenced by two major factors – performance and currency effects, 
and net new money inflow. The SD model will complement the above described framework by 
an in-depth analysis of net new money and a structure that causes net new money flow.  
The majority of private banks revenues are generated through fees and commissions on 
the assets as shown in the diagram (see Figure 2). Trading and interest income generate only a 
marginal part of the assets.  
Personnel expenses dominate the total costs of private banks, mainly due to the fact that 
wealth management is a human-capital intensive business (University of Zurich, 2011). 
Personnel costs depend on the total value of assets under management – the more clients and, 
consequently, assets a bank manages, the more personnel it would need to manage those clients. 
Administrative expenses account for the remaining part of PB costs.   
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The cost to income ratio measures a private bank’s efficiency where higher costs result in 
higher CIR while higher revenues result in lower CIR. Gross profits show the relationship 
between revenues and costs in absolute terms where higher revenues generate higher gross 
profits while higher costs decrease the gross profits.  
Figure 2: Key concepts 
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3 Chapter 3: Problem description 
In order to answer the first research question “Which forces are driving the industry 
behavior?” it is important to provide an overview of the market situation as it developed over the 
time period analyzed. The chapter starts with introduction to the situation in the global private 
banking market. Then, we discuss the situation in the Swiss private banking market.  
3.1 Global private banking 
Private banking can be called one of the most attractive segments within financial services 
in terms profitability. Yet from four years of financial turmoil it has not emerged unharmed 
(McKinsey & Company, 2012). The economic crisis led to significant changes in the global 
private banking industry. First of all, the economic downturn hit the market by reducing net new 
money inflows and putting pressure on the margins. But besides a short term effect, this also 
caused major change in the regulatory environment which will have a much longer-lasting effect 
on the market situation.   
Industry estimates published by 
Capgemini and RBC Wealth 
Management (2012) suggest that, 
although the total of the global assets 
has increased from 2008 (after a 
notable decline that year), costs 
related to managing those assets have 
risen faster (see Figure 3). The cost 
income ratio has thus increased by 16 
percentage points, rising from 63.7% 
in 2007 to 79.8% in 2010.  Companies 
are being challenged to generate 
considerable revenues in the low-interest environment while as investors more often prefer 
capital-preservation products. On the cost side, rising levels of advisor remuneration make it 
expensive to acquire and retain client relationship managers who are the private banks’ key 
resources for bringing in and managing their clients. Administrative costs are also high due to 
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high prices for expensive real estate locations and high technology and regulation compliance 
costs. 
According to the study conducted by PwC on global private banking and wealth 
management (2011), excessive new regulations have become a key concern among global wealth 
managers. New regulations affect all business models and have profound impacts on all players 
in the global market. The main idea behind the new regulations has been to reduce systemic risk 
and protect individual investors. For the market players, new regulations first of all have meant 
increasing costs – in the form of increased compliance and indirect economic effects (Capgemini 
and RBC Wealth Management, 2012). Regulations which directly affect the Swiss market will 
be described in greater detail later in this chapter.  
Besides changes in the regulations, the market is being affected by changes in consumer 
behavior. Findings of the PwC study on the global private banking and wealth management 
(2011) suggest that clients have become much more demanding. More sophisticated clients 
demand private wealth products and services which are simpler, more transparent and deliver an 
evident value.  
Structural changes caused by the economic downturn are creating a much more 
challenging environment for private banks. Initially, many industry experts hoped that the 
turbulence caused by the crisis is cyclical and the situation would reverse as soon as the market 
recovered. In later publications (e.g. McKinsey & Company, 2012) it is documented, however, 
that economic crisis has trigged lasting change. The banking industry has lost the trust of the 
public, including clients, employees and regulators. Industry experts believe that regulatory 
pressure will continue accelerating and clients will become even more demanding. Market 
players can no longer afford to remain static. Changes in the global private banking environment 
force private banks to adjust their current strategies.  
Switzerland was not an exception in terms of being affected by the new regulatory 
environment. In fact, Switzerland has been hit harder by the new regulations from cross-border 
business than those banks where West European and North American clients are or were less 
important (Swiss Bankers Association, 2011b).  
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3.2 Swiss private banking  
Switzerland has been always known globally as a leading offshore private banking centre. 
Swiss private banks have earned a reputation of being “safe haven6”. Thanks to its economic 
clout, Switzerland has been benefiting from a “safe haven” currency7 (Ranaldo and Söderlind, 
2010) and a low level of national debt (PwC, 2013). The political system in Switzerland is based 
on the principles of direct democracy which in itself has been a guarantee of continuity over the 
last two centuries. The high average standard of living and the social security system in the 
country ensures the Swiss reputation for social stability. The business environment is known for 
little corruption as well as low risk of expropriation.  
Another factor behind the success of Switzerland as a private banking center was the 
secrecy element. Since Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8
th
 of November 1934 
was issued, it has been a criminal offence for bank employees to disclose any information about 
client’s accounts to any third parties, even tax inspectors (Banking Act, 1934, as cited in Helvea 
SA, 2009). This implied that all information about accounts and accountholders was considered 
strictly confidential. This factor has been very appealing to many private banking clients for the 
reason of preserving their privacy (for instance, celebrities not willing to have their private 
wealth being discussed in media) or for the more contentious reasons of tax evasion.  
Switzerland does not tax non-residents’ assets (Helvea SA (2009). The EU citizens must 
either declare their investments to their local tax authorities or pay a withholding tax imposed by 
EU Savings Tax Directive. US citizens, in the meanwhile, are obliged to notify their local tax 
authorities about their accounts held in Switzerland. The secrecy that Swiss banks has had to 
offer and the fact that Switzerland does not impose tax on bank accounts for non-residents has 
been attracting wealthy individuals from countries with high taxes and caused them to put their 
investments in Swiss banks. It has been suspected by many that the key reason behind it was the 
knowledge that money transfers and income from investments will not be disclosed to the local 
tax authorities and, therefore, will not be taxed. For Swiss private banks many years undeclared 
money has been an important source of the net new flow. The safe haven reputation combined 
                                                 
6
 In this report “safe haven” refers to a private banking center with a stable economic, political, legal and social 
systems where invested assets are expected to retain (or even increase) their value on average and in times of market 
turbulence.  
7
 A “safe haven” currency is a currency that offers hedging value against global risk, both on average and in 
particular in crisis episodes (Swiss National Bank, 2013b).   
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with the secrecy which Swiss private banks had to offer, has been a major attraction for wealthy 
people, encouraging them to choose Switzerland over other private banking centers.  
However, after increased international pressure on their offshore business, the Swiss 
private banking has undergone a major change in its business structure (PwC, 2013). Off-shore 
models, which are primarily tax-driven are about to lose their attractiveness. Swiss private banks 
thus lose their off-shore clients, and this has resulted in steadily declining assets under 
management. The costs, on the contrary, continued to rise. Increasing cost associated with 
adjustments to new regulations and improving product and service quality pushed the costs of 
private banks up. As a consequence, the CIR has continuously been increasing over the last few 
years. Now, the industry experts are questioning whether the “golden age” of Swiss private 
banking has come to an end (PwC, 2013).  
3.2.1 Assets under management  
Figure 4 shows the development of AuM (included in the analyzed sample) from 2006 to 
2011. Assets managed by Swiss private banks peaked in 2007 and then dropped significantly in 
the course of 2008 economic turmoil. It has been falling further ever since (arrow in the diagram 
represents the current trend). 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the study conducted by PwC (2013), Swiss private banks’ AuM has been 
unfavorably affected by two factors: Firstly, negative performance figures in client portfolios 
and, second, a stern drop in net new money growth after 2008. Overall, the assets managed by 
the banks under review have dropped by 29% compared to the peak level at the end of 2007.  
Source: Developed by the author using data from PwC (2013) 
 
Figure 4: Development if Assets under Management 
Source: Developed by the author using data from PwC (2013) 
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While assets under management represent the foundation for revenue generation, the net 
new money growth rate in an indication of a bank’s ability to expand its business organically 
(University of Zurich, 2011). Despite the drop in net new money growth, actual net new money 
flow was positive throughout the whole period since 2006. This proves that Swiss private banks 
still benefit from a safe haven reputation (in particular in times of political, social and economic 
instability in European Union [EU]) and could offset (so far) the net money outflows caused by 
the new regulatory environment. Overall, however, the significant drop in net new money has the 
made Swiss private banking industry much more sensitive to external factors, such as share 
prices or currency effects.    
3.2.2 Revenues 
Figure 5 represents the development of operating income throughout the period analyzed. 
As it may be seen from the graph, operating income exhibit a similar trend to that of the assets 
under management. Operating income grew by 23% during a successful year 2007 and has fallen 
ever since. In 2009 operating income dropped even more significantly than AuM, being 
additionally impacted by decreasing margins.  
According to the research conducted by PwC (2013), there are several key reasons for the 
declining revenues. First of all, fees based on the amount of assets under management decreased 
as a result of the decline in client assets. Moreover, restrained trading activities, high liquidity of 
the assets under management, a record-low interest rate environment and clients’ growing 
distrust of complex investment products have all decreased the margins on the assets under 
management. New regulations on the offshore assets have intensified competition from service 
Figure 5: Development of operating income 
Source: Developed by the author using data from PwC (2013) 
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providers in clients’ countries of origin. Also the intensified price competition among Swiss 
private banks added to the pressure on margins.  
3.2.3 Costs 
Figure 6 shows the situation on the cost side of the equation. Costs remained relatively 
stable over the same period as private banks were not able to adjust the costs to the declining 
revenues. Banks’ needs to invest in the know-how of client relationship managers (CRM) and 
pressure originating from regulations have forced the banks in the industry to maintain the costs 
on the relatively high level. Another reason for insubstantial cost reduction is the fierce fight for 
talented staff on the market.  
3.2.4 Profitability   
 As a result of declining revenues and costs remaining at the relatively stable level, cost 
income ratios continuously increased over the period of 2007-2011. As shown in Figure 7, CIR 
before amortization rose from an average of 59% in 2007 to nearly 75% in 2011. An increase of 
26 percentage points is a significant change in just five years.  
Such dramatic increase in CIR indicates that Swiss private banks have been becoming 
increasingly unprofitable. According to the PwC (2013) study, more than 20 out of 100 private 
banks in the sample had CIR (before depreciation) over 100%, meaning that they were 
generating negative gross profits before amortization and depreciation.  
 
Figure 6: Development of personnel and operating expenses 
Source: Developed by the author using data from PwC (2013) 
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This gives a clear indication that conditions in the private banking industry in 
Switzerland have become very challenging. If the same trend continues some of the banks won’t 
be able to remain sustainable. 
3.3 Regulatory environment  
In order to answer the second research question: “What is the effect of new regulations 
on Swiss private banking?” it is important to first describe which new regulations were put into 
force during the period analyzed.  
Changes in the regulatory environment have a substantial impact on the Swiss private 
banking industry. PwC experts have described it as follows: “It is increasingly the not-so-
invisible-hand trimming profitability” (PwC, 2011, p.2), meaning that it is external regulations 
and not the internal market forces that are now shaping the market behavior.  
The economic downturn gave a cause to a series of political and legal actions that directly 
or indirectly affect the private banking industry in Switzerland. Based on the interviews with the 
market players, four main regulations which either are impacting or are expected to have a major 
effect on the industry in a short term were identified: Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and Capital, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II and Basel III. Each of them is discussed separately in the following, 
focusing on the key points directly related to this study.  
Source: Developed by the author using data from PwC (2013) 
 
Figure 7: Development of the CIR before depreciation 
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3.3.1 Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
In 2009, Switzerland has come under strong pressure from the United States (US) 
authorities to ease the rules on banking secrecy and to adopt the OECD standards on 
administrative assistance in tax matters. This happened after the attempt of the UBS
8
  to build up 
an off-shore business for its US clients transferring theirs assets to Switzerland (Helvea SA, 
2009). Pressure from the US was accelerated by politicians in the EU who joined side with the 
US.  
On 13 March 2009, the Swiss Federal Council announced that Switzerland plans to adopt 
the OECD standards on administrative assistance in tax matters and will permit the exchange of 
information with other countries (Helvea SA, 2009). For this study, the Article 26 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital which OECD (2008) is the most important:  
Article 26 creates an obligation to exchange information that is foreseeably relevant to 
the correct application of a tax convention as well as for purposes of the administration 
and enforcement of domestic tax laws of the contracting states. Countries are not at 
liberty to engage in “fishing expeditions9” or to request information that is unlikely to be 
relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. In formulating their requests, the 
requesting state should demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the requested 
information. In addition, the requesting state should also have pursued all domestic 
means to access the requested information except those that would give rise to 
disproportionate difficulties (para. 2). 
The adoption of this standard requires exchange of information on specific cases where 
there is certain evidence. Moreover, no distinction is made between tax evasion
10
 and tax fraud.
11
 
This is an important point as international administrative assistance was previously only granted 
by Switzerland in the case of tax fraud. For Swiss banks the automatic exchange of bank data 
means losing its secrecy privilege and, as a consequence, losing one of its key differentiators.  
In 2011, Switzerland negotiated several withholding tax agreements which allow Swiss 
private banks to protect their clients’ privacy and at the same time ensure the implementation of 
                                                 
8
 UBS is the biggest bank in Switzerland. Private banking is a part of UBS services.   
9
 “Fishing expeditions” here refer to the lists of tax evaders’ names without any evidence supporting them.  
10
 Tax evasion “is committed by a person who, as a taxpayer, makes no tax declaration or only an incomplete one 
(false or non-completion of the tax declaration)” (Swiss Federal Finance Department as cited in Geneva Financial 
Center, 2011). 
11
 Tax fraud is “committed by someone who, for the purpose of tax evasion, uses forged or falsified documents or 
untrue documents such as account books, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts or wage certificates and other 
certificates produced by third parties” (Swiss Federal Finance Department as cited in Geneva Financial Center, 
2011).  
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an agreement regarding countries’ legitimate tax claims. A withholding tax agreement implies 
that the final withholding tax is levied by a paying agent (typically a bank) and passed on 
anonymously to the Federal Tax Administration (FTA). Details of the client’s country of 
domicile are revealed, but the client’s name is not. The total tax revenues are then passed on to 
the relevant country of domicile by the FTA (Federal Department of Finance, 2013).  
In autumn 2011, withholding tax agreements were signed with the United Kingdom and 
Germany. In April 2012, Austria also signed a withholding tax agreement. The agreements with 
the United Kingdom and Austria entered into force on the 1
st
 of January 2013. The agreement 
with Germany was aborted because of opposition coming from the German Federal council 
(Federal Department of Finance, 2013).  
3.3.2 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)  
While Swiss authorities were in the process of negotiating bilateral tax treaties, a new 
challenge came from the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Final FATCA 
regulations were issued on January 17, 2013 (KPMG, 2013). FATCA was designed by the US 
authorities aiming at closing loopholes in existing tax compliancy regulations. FATCA is a 
highly complex framework that significantly complicates the US clients’ tax reporting rules 
(University of Zurich, 2011).   
The new regulation is planned to be put in force in stages with the first stage starting on 
the January 1, 2014. For Swiss private banks, FATCA will first of all mean a significant increase 
in reporting rules related to tax information about the US clients and, consequently, further 
increase in the reporting related costs.  
3.3.3 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) 
Another challenge which Swiss private banks are awaiting is related to the introduction 
of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II). According to PwC (2012b) 
report MiFID II seeks to enhance investor protection by maximizing transparency and reducing 
data fragmentation. MiFID II introduces larger regulatory requirements to account for 
developments in technology and market infrastructure in the financial services industry.  
The expected implementation date for MiFID II recently moved from 2012/2013 to 
2014/2015. Besides the operational and technological implications, the key implications on 
Swiss private banks will again be related to an increase in costs. Increase in costs of execution 
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and infrastructure stem from the move to regulated venues and associated reporting, transparency 
and conduct requirements will increase notable. Moreover, a wider range of products will be 
considered “complex” (requiring the development of an advisory model) (PwC, 2012b).  
3.3.4 Basel III 
In October 2011, the Swiss legislator published a proposal for the implementation of the 
new regulatory framework called Basel III. The new capital regime aims at achieving a higher 
resilience of banks to losses compared to the regime under the Basel II framework (Schellenberg 
Wittmer, 2012). The key challenge that Basel III brings to private banks is associated with 
increase of the minimum capital requirement for the key ratio of common equity to risk-weighted 
assets.  
Basel III entered into force in January 2013, with an implementation period expected to 
last until the end of 2018. Basel III adds another uncertainty to the short term future of private 
banks in Switzerland.  
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4 Chapter 4: Dynamic Hypothesis  
In order to explain causes of the dynamic problem described in the previous chapter and 
to come up with possible policies, it is important to understand the underlying structure of the 
system.  
In this chapter the structure of Swiss private banking industry will be described. The SD 
model which represents the structure of private banking market in Switzerland consists of three 
major sectors: the AuM sector, the personnel sector, and the financial sector. Each of the sectors 
will be described and explained separately. Table 2 gives a brief introduction to the major 
sectors.  
Table 2: Introduction to the major sectors 
The simulation time of the model is set for 2006-2018. The simulation starts on the first 
day of 2006 [01.01.2006]. The period from 2006 to the end of 2011 is a historical period (the 
model aims at representing the historic data development for this period) and the period from 
2012-2018 is a forecast period (the model aims at making reliable predictions for this period).  
Figure 8 represents a causal loop diagram that was developed after the desk research was 
conducted. This causal loop diagram was also confirmed by the market players during the first 
modeling workshop. Figure 8 represents the main hypothesis which suggests that the behavior of 
AuM sector Explains the structure behind the assets 
managed by private banks. Consists of two 
subsectors: on-shore AuM and off-shore 
AuM. 
Personnel sector Gives a simplified representation of the 
personnel structure. Consists of three 
subsectors: front office, middle office and 
back office. 
Financial sector Represents financial structure of the market. 
Focuses mainly on net income components. 
Consists of three subsectors: operating 
income, operating costs and net income 
statement. 
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the industry during the period analyzed has been largely driven by the external factors and the 
“not-so-invisible-hand” represented by the new regulations. 
Variables in dark blue color represent external variables which Swiss private banks 
cannot affect with their policies. Attractiveness of Swiss private banking for the off-shore clients 
depends on three main components: Product and service quality, Safe haven reputation and 
Secrecy. The safe haven reputation and the secrecy are external while the product and service 
quality could be defined by the market players. Regulatory pressure has a direct affect on secrecy 
and on costs. 
Two loops B1 Cost pressure and B2 Cost pressure replicate the current policies 
implemented by the market players in response to the declining profits. B1 indicates measures 
directed at reducing administrative costs and B2 represents measures directed at staff reduction.   
Income
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+
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Client base
+
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Swiss private banking
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-
Costs
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Figure 8: Initial causal loop diagram 
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4.1 Assets under management 
AuM is one of the key private banking indicators which shows the amount of all invested 
assets held under a discretionary or advisory asset management mandate at a certain period of 
time. The following positions are regarded as assets under management: securities held in client 
portfolios, fiduciary deposits, amounts due to clients in savings and investment accounts, as well 
as other amounts due to clients from time deposits (Swiss Bankers Association, 2012). In the 
market research terms, AuM is an indication of the size of the private banking industry. 
Therefore, AuM is one of the central elements in the model. Private banks report the level of 
assets under management as per year ended in Swiss francs (CHF).  
 AuM in the private banking sector can be segmented in accordance with various 
parameters, for instance, by type of clientele (HNWI or UHNWI), by type of securities clients 
are holding or by country/region of client’s origin. For the purpose of this study, the key 
differentiation was made between local and foreign assets – investments made by on-shore and 
off-shore client, respectively. Off-shore clients refer to Swiss private banking clients not 
domiciled in Switzerland while on-shore clients refer to private banking clients which are 
residents of Switzerland.  
   Initially, the structure of AuM was planned to be expended with a co-structure to 
simulate clientele. However, private banks do not publish data for the number of people for 
whom they managing accounts.  From the interviews, it was concluded that using the average 
value that a client invests to calculate the number of clients in the industry would not represent 
the real situation in the industry. Moreover, during one of the modeling workshops, it was 
mentioned that an in-depth analysis of the AuM structure rather than the clientele structure 
would make the SD model easier to understand and follow by the market players. Therefore, it 
was concluded that AuM should be the main focus area.  
4.1.1 On-shore assets under management  
Figure 9 shows the basic structure of on-shore AuM, where the stock of assets is being 
influenced by two flows – Net on shore AuM change due to change in net new money and Net 
on-shore AuM change due to performance and currency effects. Industry reports as well as 
annual reports of private banks give the change of AuM from the beginning of the year to the end 
in percent. Therefore, a matching variable was introduced in the model and, the following 
formula was used to calculate the value of the stock in the beginning of the year:  
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"Initial on-shore AuM"=SAMPLE IF TRUE (MODULO (Time, Period) <1e-006,"On-
shore AuM", "On-shore AuM")  
Net on-shore AuM change due to new money is a multiplication of the initial value of the 
on-shore AuM and the percentage change due to net new money. Similarly, the Net on-shore 
AuM change due to performance is a multiplication of the initial value of the stock and a 
percentage change due to performance and currency effects.  
Swiss National Bank (as 
cited in PwC, 2013) reported the 
proportion of the security holdings 
attributed to off-shore clients to be 
around 59% at the beginning of 
2006. This value was used as a 
benchmark to calculate the initial 
value of the on-shore AuM stock. 
According to the industry experts, 
Swiss private banking clientele is 
very loyal to their local banking 
services. The share of Swiss to 
hold their private assets in other 
than Switzerland private banking 
centers is very low. Action of the 
private banks, therefore, do not 
cause a change in the on-shore AuM stock on the level of the country (on-shore clients move 
from one Swiss private bank to another, but this process is not set to be the focus of this 
research). Net new money is being dependent on the new wealth creation. Performance and 
currency effects are also purely external.  
4.1.2 Off-shore AuM 
Off-shore is the other important part of Swiss private banking business. Swiss safe haven 
reputation in an uncertain world of today, Swiss privilege of banking secrecy and a high quality 
of banking products and services has led wealthy individuals to place their money in Swiss 
On-shore AuM
Net on-shore AuM
change due to
performance
Net on-shore AuM
change due to new
money
Initial on-shore AuM
Net new money (%)
Performance and
currency effects (%)
Period<Time>
<Forecasted perfomance
and currency effect (%)>
<Time>
Figure 9: On-shore AuM 
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private banks’ accounts. Secrecy has been more important for some clients than for the others. 
According to Helvea SA (2009), secrecy was more important for clients coming from Western 
Europe, notably France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK due to the possibility to avoid paying 
tax. As it was mentioned in the problem description part, EU citizens have an option to either 
declare their earning to their local tax authorities or pay a withholding tax. However, according 
to the Helvea SA (2009) study, the scope of the investment income which is actually taxed is 
very restricted. Helvea SA (2009) estimates that around 80% of EU-sourced money was not 
declared to local tax authorities in 2009.  
Therefore, in the model a distinction between declared off-shore assets and undeclared 
off-shore assets should be made. Off-shore assets are represented by two stocks – declared off-
shore assets (Off-shore DAuM) and undeclared off-shore assets (UAuM). The general structure 
associated with off-shore stocks is the same as for on-shore assets – the stocks are being 
influenced by performance and currency effects flows and by the flows of net new money. The 
key difference for the off-shore structure is the split of the net new money netflow into the new 
money gain rate and money loss rate as shown in Figure 10. The loss rate is comprised from a 
sum of assets lost due to wealth loss or spending (for instance, in a case when an account has 
been inherited by several legatees and as a result of the split new accounts do not total up to 
USD1 million) and assets loss to competitors (clients taking their assets to other private banking 
centers).  
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Figure 10: Declared and undeclared off-shore AuM 
27 
 
The flow, which represents the declaration rate, connects declared off-shore assets (Off-
shore DAuM) and undeclared off-shore assets (UAuM). The structure follows the basics of one 
of the diffusion model where off-shore assets are moving from the undeclared to the declared 
assets stock over time.   
To calculate the initial value of the off-shore AuM stocks, data regarding the origins of 
the accounts was first collected. The SNB (as cited in Helvea SA, 2009) published the data about 
custody accounts by currency as per end of 2007 (as shown in Figure 10). Following the logic 
described in the Helvea SA (2009) study it is assumed that all the assets invested in euro came 
from Europe and most “Other” category covers investments made in British pound. Furthermore, 
it is being assumed that around 50% of Swiss banks’ off-shore accounts have their origins in the 
European Union. Applying this approach to 
the sample analyzed, EU-sourced money in 
the sample equals CHF727 billion at the 
beginning of the period analyzed. Helvea 
SA (2009) estimates that around 80% of 
EU-sourced money was not declared and 
assuming that the declaration rate between 
2006 and 2009 was very low, it was 
estimated that undeclared EU money in the 
beginning of 2006 equaled to CHF348 
billion. The off-shore declared AuM totaled 
to CHF480 billion.  
Off-shore assets gain rate both of declared and non-declared AuM is being influenced by 
the attractiveness of Swiss private banking for foreign investors. Even so, factors that define the 
attractiveness to declared and non-declared clients are not the same. As shown in Figure 10, the 
attractiveness for declared clients is a function of the safe haven reputation and service and 
product quality that clients receive in Swiss private banks. The importance of safe haven 
reputation and product and service is showing the significance of the factors for a client when 
choosing a private banking center. For undeclared clients, the attractiveness function includes 
perceived secrecy besides product and service quality and “safe haven” reputation. Secrecy and 
reputation of safe haven are factors that the industry cannot influence. Therefore they are 
Figure 11: Swiss non-resident custody accounts by currency 
(end-2007) 
Source: SNB as cited in Helvea SA (2009), replicated by the 
author. 
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exogenous. Product and service quality is being defined by policies that market players 
implement in order to keep the initial value of the quality or adjust it, therefore, they are 
endogenous.  
The following formulas were used to calculated attractiveness for declared and non-declared 
clients, respectfully: 
Attractiveness of Swiss PB for declared client = Safe haven reputation 
(Time)*Importance of safe haven reputation + Swiss service and product quality*(1-
Importance of safe haven reputation) 
Attractiveness of Swiss PB for undeclared clients = Safe haven reputation 
(Time)*Importance of safe haven reputation + Perceived secrecy*Importance of secrecy 
+ Swiss service and product quality*(1-Importance of secrecy-Importance of safe haven 
reputation)  
 
Figure 12: Attractiveness of Swiss private banking for declared and non-declared clients 
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Data for these variables was collected during the interviews with market players. 
Interviewees were asked to estimate values of qualitative variables on a scale [0-100] and to 
sketch the behavior of variables over time. Also, market players were asked to assign coefficients 
to estimate the importance of each factor for clients.  
 To model the effect of attractiveness on assets gain rate, the actual value of attractiveness 
is compared to the initial value (in the model called reference attractiveness). When the 
attractiveness ratio is 1 (the reference attractiveness is equal to actual attractiveness), then the 
effect on the gain rate will also be 1 (the actual gain rate will be the same as the reference gain 
rate). As portrayed in Figure 10, the same logic is applied to both declared assets gain and 
undeclared assets gain. The INITIAL function was used to calculate the reference attractiveness.  
Reference attractiveness for undeclared clients = INITIAL (Attractiveness of Swiss 
PB for undeclared clients)  
Reference attractiveness for declared clients = INITIAL (Attractiveness of Swiss PB 
for declared clients) 
The effect that attractiveness has on the assets gain rate is non-linear, meaning that first a 
marginal increase in attractiveness leads to corresponding marginal increase in the client gain 
rate. The further increase in the 
attractiveness the less impact it will have as 
shown in Figure 13. To calculate the actual 
gain rate, the effect of attractiveness is 
multiplied by a reference gain rate. The 
reference values of the gain rate were 
estimated based on historic data available 
for the net new money. The same 
dependence is true for both declared and 
non-declared assets gain rate.  Figure 13: Non-linear effect of attractiveness on AuM gain rate 
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4.1.3 Effect of new regulations on AuM  
The regulations that were put into force after the global financial downturn took place  
had a major effect on assets managed in Swiss private banks. First of all, Swiss private banking 
started to lose one of its major differentiators – secrecy.   
To demonstrate the effect of new regulations on assets, a variable “Regulatory pressure” 
has been introduced. The values of the variable are set to be either 0 or 100 as prior to 
introduction and after, respectfully. The formula used to show regulatory pressure is the 
following:  
Regulatory pressure = IF THEN ELSE (Time<2009, 0, 100) 
 The regulatory pressure had an effect on the perceived secrecy with a certain perception 
delay. In the model it is represented using SMOOTH function:  
Perceived secrecy = SMOOTH (IF THEN ELSE (Regulatory pressure=0, 100, 0), 
Regulation perception delay) 
Besides the effects which regulations had on the secrecy, the new regulations have 
pushed the private banking industry towards a more compliant business model, meaning that 
private banks are less inclined to accept the new undeclared money. The implementation was, 
however, not immediate, but characterized by a certain implementation delay. In the model, the 
effect of regulation pressure on the new undeclared assets gain rate is represented using the 
following formula:  
UAuM gain rate (%) = SMOOTH (IF THEN ELSE (Regulatory pressure=0, Indicated 
UAuM gain rate, 0), Declaration implementation delay 
What is most important, new regulation have resulted in increased assets outflow. On the 
one hand, the outflow of undeclared assets increased because some of the clients who had their 
assets in Switzerland primarily due to the secrecy, decided to move their private wealth to other 
private banking centers immediately. Therefore, the overall client loss rate to competitors 
increased. Besides the increased undeclared assets loss rate, regulators have put a pressure on 
undeclared clients to declare their assets to local tax authorities. The declaration process has also 
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trigged clients’ consideration for moving their assets to their home countries as Switzerland lost 
its major competitive advantage of secrecy. A retention rate is represented as a fraction of assets 
which clients decide to keep in Switzerland.  
Another important factor which resulted in increase outflow of the assets is the fact that   
clients tend to withdraw much higher amounts for their spending needed when their assets are 
declared than undeclared.  In the model it means that the fraction AuM loss due to spending is 
much high for declared assets than for undeclared. Therefore, the higher the declared assets stock 
gets due to declaration process, the higher actual assets outflow due to spending.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets’ retention rate is a function of the attractiveness and the perceived price – a price 
which clients pay for private banking products and services that they are using (see Figure 12). 
Attractiveness plays a more important role in clients’ decision process than perceived price. 
Therefore, a higher coefficient is applied for attractiveness than for the perceived price in the 
calculation of retention rate. 
The effect of attractiveness on the retention rate is modeled using a graphical function to 
portray a non-linear effect of a change in attractiveness on the retention rate. The same structure 
is used to portray the non-linear effect of a change in price on change in retention rate. 
 In the model, the indicated declaration rate is assigned a value of 1, which means that 
new regulations will result in all the money moving from undeclared to being declared. Yet, the 
actual declaration did not happen immediately after the new regulations were put into force. The 
declaration implementation delay indicates the time that it will take all undeclared money to 
become declared. The following formula was used to represent the fraction of the declaration 
rate: 
Perceived price
Perception delay
Retention rate
Effect of pervceived
price on retention rate
Reference
retention rate
<Time>
Attractivness for
undeclared clients ratio
Effect of attractivness
on retention rate
Reference
perceived price
Perceived price ratio
<Gross margin>
Figure 14: Retention rate 
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Declaration rate (%) = SMOOTH (IF THEN ELSE (Regulatory pressure=0, 0, 
"Indicated declaration rate (%)"), Declaration implementation delay)  
The DAuM loss due to declaration shows assets’ repatriation process e.g. loss of clients 
to banking centers in their home countries. Declared AuM loss due to declaration is being 
calculated by multiplying those assets that clients consider moving out of Switzerland after they 
were declared by the fraction of assets that was actually moved:   
DAuM loss due to declaration = AuM under consideration to repatriate*(1-Retention 
rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows in which way, the new regulations affect the assets under management 
structure. A complete stock and flow diagram of the assets under management sectors is 
presented in the Appendix C1.  
 In sum, there are three main stocks in the AuM sector: on-shore AuM, undeclared off-
shore AuM and declared off-shore AuM. The sum of these three stocks is the total of all assets 
managed by private banks in Switzerland. Total AuM is an input to the next sector – Personnel.   
Figure 15: Effect of new regulations on AuM 
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4.2 Personnel 
Personnel costs constitute the major driver of the total operating costs of Swiss private 
banks. Therefore, it is important to include at least a simplified representation of the personnel 
structure in the model to describe the industry in a coherent way. Personnel in private banks may 
be categorized as front office, middle office and back office personnel.  
4.2.1 Front office 
Generally Front office is a term which is used to refer to a company's departments that in 
one or another way come in contact with clients. In private banking, front office is used to refer 
to client relationship managers (CRMs) and investment research personnel.   
Private banking business is very much about personal relationship between a client and 
his/her CRM. Very often clients are very loyal to one specific client relationship manager. 
Among private banks poaching individual CRMs or even entire team from competitors’ is one of 
the popular measures of banks’ attempts to increase their AuM. However, this is usually the case 
for private banks within the same country. Therefore, for the Swiss private banking industry 
model an important conclusion to be drawn is the fact that CRMs besides being one the key cost 
drivers also constitute one of their key assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Client relationship managers 
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Private banks usually set the level of CRMs they need based on the amount of clients 
they have. If the gap between desired level and current level is positive, they hire more. If, 
however, there are more CRMs than needed to serve existing clients, CRMs are usually assigned 
to search for new clients. In reality the process is even more complex. However, for the purpose 
of this study it is sufficient to assume that the hiring process is based on the gap between the 
desired level and actual level of CRMs in the banks as shown in Figure 16.  
 The CRM structure contains two stocks – New CRMs and Experienced CRMs – to 
represent newly hired CRMs and client relationship managers which have already developed 
their clients’ portfolios, respectively. This structure is used to capture the industry and, therefore, 
it shows the movement of CRMs in (e.g. young professionals or experienced investment 
managers coming from different banking sectors) and out of the industry (e.g. retiring or 
changing jobs from private banking to another industry). Competition among private banks for 
CRMs within the industry is not captured in this structure.  
 The desired level of CRM is 
calculated by dividing total clients 
in the industry by average CRM 
effectiveness. The New CRM stock 
adjusts itself to the desired level of 
personnel with a first order delay – 
the time needed to hire personnel. 
The new CRM hiring rate flow 
captures, not only the gap between 
desired and actual state, but also 
takes the expected CRM quitting 
rate into account. The rate between 
new CRMs and experienced CRMs 
shows the transition rate. Again, 
with the first order delay – time to 
create clients’ portfolio – new 
CRMs are moving from being new 
to being experienced employees. 
Total clients
IR
New IR hiring rate
Desired level of
Experienced IR
Experienced IR gap
Ir average time in
banking
Time to hire new IR
Expected IR
quiting rate
IR quiting
information delay
IR quiting rate
Avg IR effectivness
Figure 17: Investments researchers 
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New CRMs quitting rate is very low – it is very 
uncommon among inexperienced relationship 
managers to move from private banking to another 
industry. Experienced CRMs quitting rate is 
governed by first order delay with – average time in 
banking being the adjustment time.   
Investment research refers to investment 
professionals whose key responsibilities involve 
managing clients’ portfolios and recommending 
products. The structure associated with Investment 
research contains one stock of investments 
researchers (IR) (see Figure 18). The structure 
around the stock follows the same modeling logics 
as described above for the CRMs, just with one 
stock.  Because IRs need less time to become 
experienced than CRMs (IRs do not need time to create their clients’ portfolio). The desired level 
of investment research professionals is also been set by dividing the total level of clients in the 
industry by the average effectiveness of one investment researcher.   
 The sum of total CRMs and total IRs shows the total level of front office staff. 
Considering that the level of front office staff depends on the level of managed assets, it can be 
concluded that front office expenses can be regarded as variable costs.  
4.2.2 Middle and back office 
Middle office is comprised of risk management staff, financial personnel and compliance 
specialists. In contrast, to the front office, the desired level of middle office personnel is not 
dependent on the amount of assets that private banks are managing and, therefore, can be 
regarded as fixed costs. Back office staff conducts transactions processing, general operations 
and IT operations. The level of the back office work force also does not depend on the level of 
assets managed by bank, but is rather dependent on external factors such as, e.g. regulations. 
Since the back office and the middle office follow the same structure, the simplified 
representation of back and middle office will be consolidated in one stock (in the model B&M – 
Back and Middle – office).  
Figure 18: Back and middle office 
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The basic structure is very 
similar to the structure of IR (see Figure 
19). Key difference is being the fact that 
the desired level of back office 
personnel is an external variable. Also, 
according to the trade interviews, back 
office staff can be laid off, meaning that 
when the actual level of back office 
staff is exceeding the desired level, 
desired layoff is positive. The layoff 
rate is being calculated by dividing the 
gap by the layoff time.  
4.2.3 Effect of new regulations on personnel 
As discussed in Chapter 3, new regulations that were put into force after the economic 
crisis have had an effect not only on assets and, consequently, on revenues, but also on costs. 
One of the major implications of new external requirements was an increase in personnel, mainly 
in compliance and risk management required to run a private banking business.   
In the model, additional back and middle office staff, needed due to regulations, 
represents an additional number of professionals which are needed as a result of the pressure 
coming from new regulations as shown in Figure 19. The following formula was used to 
calculate the indicated regulation effect on the desired level of back and middle office personnel: 
 
"Indicated effect on desired level of B&M office" = IF THEN ELSE (Regulatory 
pressure>0, "Additional B&M office need due to new regulations", 1) 
Indicated effect is then being added to the reference level of desired back and middle 
office to calculate the actual desired level of back and middle office staff. The expression 
“desired level of back and middle office” is used to show the need for personnel. In reality, 
however, an additional increase in back and middle office staff is not desired for private banks. 
Figure 19: Effect of new regulations on desired level of back and 
middle office 
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Additional increase in back and middle office personnel means additional personnel costs and no 
added value for the clients and, therefore, no added value for the banks.  
 Not only have new regulations impacted the back and middle office staff also new 
regulations have brought a need for front office personnel to do additional tasks related to 
dealing with one client so that 
that their working efficiency 
has decreased. In the model 
this is represented as an effect 
of regulation on CRM 
effectiveness as shown in 
Figure 20.  
In sum, the personnel 
structure is represented using 
four main stocks: New CRM, 
Experienced CRM, IR (these 
three summed together 
represent front office), and Back and Middle office stock (which consolidated back and middle 
office personnel). The sum of the total front staff and back and middle office staff represents the 
total personnel in the industry. Total personnel is an input to the next sector – Financials. The 
full stock and flow structure of the Personnel sector is presented in Appendix C2. 
4.3 Financial sector  
Due to the time limits applied on this project, only a simplified representation of the 
financial sector has been implemented. The basic profit and loss structure is the key focus area 
whereas the balance sheet structure was left aside.  
In the model, the financial sector aims at representing the basic structure of income and 
costs accounts and calculating gross and net profits. Tracking changes in the financial results 
provides us with an opportunity to track the implications of the model’s internal dynamics.  
4.3.1 Operating income 
Private banks generate income from fees charged to clients for products and services 
provided. Clients’ accounts can be of two types – discretionary (accounts managed 
Figure 20: Effect of new regulations on CRM effectiveness 
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professionally by brokers) and brokerage accounts which allow banks to generate income from 
initial public offerings (IPOs) or secondary offerings. The fee structure can vary from one bank 
to another, but generally banks charge a fee on discretionary mandates based on the size of the 
account, collecting the fee every month or each quarter. Private banks also provide other 
services, such as estate planning or tax income planning.  
Net fee and commission income generate the major part of total operating income of 
private banks and is, therefore, the focus of this research. Trading and interest income are 
considered exogenous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the model, fee and commission income is modeled as a flow that accumulates in the 
“cumulative fee and commission income” stock as shown in Figure 21. The flow of fee and 
commission income calculates the income generated every TIME STEP (which is set to be equal 
to roughly one month) by multiplying assets under management using the gross margin. The 
stock shows how income accumulates over a year. To follow the accounting logic, the 
cumulative fee and commission income stock accumulates over a year and is being emptied on 
the last day of every year. To represent this process, the following function was used: 
Reset cum fee and commission income = IF THEN ELSE (Yearly pulse>0, (Cum fee 
and commission income/TIME STEP) + Fee and commission income, 0), where  
Yearly pulse = PULSE TRAIN (2007-TIME STEP, TIME STEP, 1, 2019) 
Figure 21: Fee and commission income 
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Trading and interest income although uses external data as input, following the same basic 
structure as fee and commission income as shown in Figure 22. 
 The sum of fee and commission income and trading and the interest income flows is the 
total operating income. In the same way, the sum of the stocks amounts the cumulative operating 
income. The full stock and flow structure of income subsector is presented in Appendix C3. 
4.3.2 Operating expenses  
Operating expenses consolidate two key private banks’ expenses groups: Personnel 
expenses and administrative expenses. Personnel expenses generate the major part of total 
operating expenses of private banks and, therefore, are the focus of this research. Administrative 
expenses are considered exogenous.   
In the model, the structure that represents personnel and administrative expenses is an 
analog to the operating income structure explained in operating income part.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cum trading and
interest income
Trading and
interest income
Reset trading and
interest income
<Yearly pulse> <TIME STEP>Trading and interest
income per year
<Time>
Figure 22: Trading and interest income 
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Figure 23: Personnel expenses 
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As shown in Figure 23, Personnel expenses are modeled as a flow that accumulates in the 
“cumulative personnel expenses”. The flow of personnel expenses calculates expenses for all 
personnel in the industry every TIME STEP by multiplying total personnel by cost per 
employee. Cost per employee is an average value for the industry of the costs experienced by 
private banks for managing one employee per year. It includes salaries and bonuses (if any). The 
cumulative personnel expenses stock portrays how personnel related expenses accumulate over a 
year. To follow basic accountancy logics, the cumulative personnel expenses stock accumulates 
over a year and is being emptied on the last day of every year. “Reset personnel expenses” 
represents the same structure as “reset cumulative fee and commission income” described before.  
Administrative expenses although is governed by an external data as an input follow the same 
basic structure as personnel expense as shown in Figure 24.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investments are a part of expenses that improve quality of products and services for the 
clients. “Reference investments” represent a part of costs that private banks have to spend over 
one year in order to maintain the quality of products and services at its initial value (see Figure 
23). “Investments” represent the actual level of investments which has been made over year.  
Cum admin
expenses
Admin expenses Reset admin
expenses
<Yearly pulse> <TIME STEP>
<Time>
Admin expenses
per year
Figure 24: Administrative expenses 
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The Investment ratio compares investments made to investments that should have been 
made in order to maintain the quality of products and services at their initial value. When the 
ratio is equal to 1, product service quality is at its initial value (in the model – reference service 
and product quality represents the initial value of product and service quality) as shown in Figure 
25.  
 The effect that the change in the investment ratio has on product and service quality is 
non-linear. The maximum of the effect is set to be 1.25. This means that the maximum positive 
effect that change in investment ratio can 
have on the reference product and 
service quality is 25%. This is related to 
the fact that product and service quality 
is measured on a absolute scale [0-100]. 
When reference product and service 
quality is 80, the maximum increase that 
it can have not to exceed its maximum 
value of 100, is 25%. Product and 
service quality is an input into 
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Figure 25: Investments 
Figure 26: Effect of investments on service and product quality 
42 
 
attractiveness of private banking for both declared and non-declared clients, as discussed in the 
“Assets under management” part earlier in this chapter.  
4.3.3 Operating profit before tax and net profit  
Operating profit is one of the key profitability indicators that show the level of earnings 
before tax on earnings is applied. In the model, a very simplified representation of the income 
statement is presented. Operating profits are being calculated by subtracting operating expenses 
from operating income. In order to calculate net income, the accrual of taxes is first being 
calculated. Then, at the end of every year, the accrued tax is being subtracted from gross profit in 
order to calculate the final profitability indicator – net profit.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Effect of new regulations on financial results  
In sum, new regulations which were put into force after the economic downturn have had 
effect on the structure of both income and expenses. Income has been affected through the effect 
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Figure 27: Simplified income statement 
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that new regulations have had on the level of assets managed in the industry. New regulations 
have put a pressure on banks not to accept new undeclared money. This results in decrease 
inflow of new AuM. Furthermore, new regulations have pressured undeclared clients to declare 
their assets. The declaration process has had a consequence on client loss rate. Expenses were 
affected both through an undesired increase in total personnel as well as increase in 
administrative costs (mainly associated with additional investments in IT systems that, however, 
do not have any added value for the clients).  
4.4 Current policies  
In lights of the changing market environment market players have been implementing a 
number of policies directed at improving the situation. From the interviews with the market 
players, the key policies being implemented by private banks are: 
 Outsourcing (mainly back office services)  
 Operational efficiency policies 
 Infrastructure consolidation  
When considering the industry as a whole, all these policies in one or another way are 
directed at cost reduction. In the model, it is assumed that the decision makers, based on the 
unsatisfying financial results, introduce staff reduction policies. For instance outsourcing back 
office services allows banks to reduce desired level of back office workforce.  
To show how negative change in gross profit fosters market players to implement cost 
reduction policies, we first introduce a variable that represent the ratio between current profits 
against profits in a former year.  To calculate profits in a former year (in the model, Gross profit 
in the year N-1) the following formula was applied:  
"Gross profit in the year N-1"= DELAY INFORMATION (Gross profit, Initial gross 
profit) 
The ratio between current gross profits and gross profits in a former year gives an 
indication to the market players whether profits have increased or decreased over a year. When 
the gross profits ratio is below 1, the effect of policies on the desired level of back office staff 
and administrative expenses is activated.  
44 
 
In sum, Chapter 4 aimed at explaining the structure behind the Swiss private banking 
industry before and after new regulations were introduced. After the analysis of the structure had 
been made, it was concluded that industry behavior has been largely driven by the external 
factors that private banks cannot control. Among those: market performance, currency exchange 
effects, safe haven reputation, the secrecy and the new regulations. Product and service quality is 
one of the main internal drivers.  
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5 Chapter 5: Model analysis and testing  
To make sure that the results of the model described in Chapter 4 can be trusted and used 
for the market analysis, the model should be analyzed thoroughly. “Validity of the results in a 
model-based study are crucially dependent on the validity of the model” (Barlas, 1996, p. 183). 
Before using the model for policy analysis, enough confidence should be built in its validity, coherency 
and ability to recreate historic behavior for the right reasons. According to Barlas (1996), there are three 
main categories of system dynamics validation tests: direct structure tests, structure-oriented behavior 
tests, and behavior pattern tests. Chapter 5 describes the process of model analysis and validation.  
5.1 Unit consistency 
Dimensional consistency is one of the key tests that should be performed to validate the 
model. A units’ consistency test can reveal important flaws in the structure of the model. Vensim, 
which has been used to develop the model, has a unit checking feature which checks the model 
equation for the consistent use of units of measurement. The software units’ checks do not prevent 
the simulation from having errors, but rather helps to find problems that might otherwise have 
been overlooked. The unit consistency tests were conducted by checking the model equation-by-
equation and conducting the unit consistency tests for each of the equation separately. When a 
new structure was added to the model, it was immediately tested for face and units’ consistency. 
Conducting the unit consistency tests brought better understanding of the structure of the model 
and proved that model does not contain any inconsistencies.   
5.2 Extreme conditions tests 
The literature (Peterson and Eberlein, 1994; Sterman, 2000) emphasizes the importance of a 
model being robust in extreme conditions. A model should behave in a realistic way no matter how 
extreme the inputs imposed on it may be. The extreme conditions test can be performed by analyzing 
the equations used in the model and studying the simulated behavior.  
Vensim has a special SyntheSim (for Synthesis of Simulations) feature which allows to 
synthesize model structure and simulation behavior. The software allows seeing the results of 
simulations superimposed on the model diagrams. It instantly updates these displays as model 
constants and lookups are being changed. SyntheSim feature is extremely helpful when 
conducting extreme conditions tests.  
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Using SyntheSim function a variety of constants and lookups were tested. The following 
tests’ results are reported below: 
 Extreme condition 1: Extremely high performance and currency effect 
 Extreme condition 2: Extremely long declaration implementation delay   
 Extreme condition 3: Extremely low CRM effectiveness  
 Extreme condition 4: Extremely low costs per employee 
5.2.1 Extreme condition 1: Extremely high performance and currency effect 
The first extreme condition test aimed at testing model’s behavior when performance and 
currency effects are set to extremely high value 1 (100%). This means that every year the inflow of 
AuM due to performance and currency effects would be equal to the value of stock in the end of the 
last year.  
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Figure 28: AuM under normal and extremely high 
performance and currency effect value 
Figure 29: Operating expenses under normal and extremely 
high performance and currency effect value 
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Figure 31: Gross profit under normal and extremely high 
performance and currency effect value 
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The results of the first extreme condition test showed (see Figures 28-31) that when 
performance and currency effect is set to extremely high value, the total assets under 
management is showing exponential growth because the value of the inflow due to performance 
will always dominate any other affect that other flows might have. As a result of the exponential 
growth of AuM, operating income, expenses and profit are also increasing exponentially. This 
simulation proved that the model shows adequate behavior under this extreme condition.   
5.2.2 Extreme condition 2: Extremely long declaration implementation delay   
The second extreme condition test aimed at examining the behavior of the declared and 
undeclared assets stocks when the declaration implementation delay is set to an extremely high 
number. This would mean that although the implementation was put into force in 2009, there 
was no actual declaration implementation during 2009-2011.  
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Figure 33: Off-shore UaM under normal and extremely 
high declaration implementation delay 
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The results of the test (see Figures 32-35) showed that under extremely high declaration 
implementation delay there is no AuM moving from UAuM stock to DAuM stock. Declaration rate 
is equal to 0, and consequently, there is no client loss due to declaration. Results of this simulation 
also represent the hypothetical situation well.   
5.2.2 Extreme condition 3: Extremely low CRM effectiveness  
The third extreme conditions test was conducted in order to test the behavior of the model 
when effectiveness of client relationship managers is set to be very low. This would mean that for 
managing the same amount of clients, a much higher number of CRMs would be needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The test results (see Figures 36-39) showed that when effectiveness of CRMs is very low, the 
level of personnel increases significantly. Total staff is showing a goal-seeking behavior, where the 
desired level of personnel is a goal which is set at very high level due to a very low effectiveness of 
the client relationship managers. Total operating expenses, consequently, also increase significantly. 
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Figure 37: Total operating expenses under normal 
and extremely low CRM effectiveness  
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Figure 39: Accrual of taxes under normal and 
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Gross profits, on the contrary, decay sharply due to very high costs related to personnel. Figure 38 
shows that taxes are being accrued only when gross profit is positive. This simulation also produced 
expected results and did not reveal any flaws.   
5.2.3 Extreme condition 4: Extremely low costs per employee 
 The fourth test which was conducted aimed at testing the behavior of the model when cots 
per employee are set to extremely low value. This would mean that having the same amount of 
employees would have costed banks very little. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the simulation (as shown in Figures 40-41) show that when costs per 
employee are set to extremely low value, expenses related to personnel are also extremely low. 
Consequently, the gross profits showed much higher values than under normal conditions. 
Simulations results met the predictions and therefore, did not reveal any major inconsistencies.   
After performing the extreme conditions tests no major flaws in the equations were 
discovered. The simulations showed realistic results for the historic period when extreme values 
were assigned to the parameters.   
5.3 Behavior pattern tests 
To evaluate the accuracy of the model designed, the produced behavior should be 
compared to the actual data available for the historic period. Behavior pattern tests show if a 
model reproduces the problem behavior adequately (Sterman, 2000). Conducting behavior pattern 
tests should give additional confidence in the structure of the model. The test will completed by 
comparing the simulated data to the reference data.   
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5.3.1 AuM reference mode test 
Figure 42 shows the comparison of the historic development of AuM and the behavior 
produced by the model. The arrow, just as in the problem description part, indicates the current 
trend. Total AuM data (red line) represents the reference mode. Blue line shows the simulated 
behavior. The visual comparison shows a rather good fit between simulated and reference 
graphs. The calculated correlation coefficient (R
2
) is equal to 0.99 and RMSE divided by run 
average is 1.3%. Statistical tests also prove that graphs have a very close fit. A very close 
correlation between the reference mode and the simulation results during the historic period is 
due to the fact that key factors driving the behavior are external: performance and currency 
effects, Safe haven reputation and regulatory pressure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: AuM reference mode test 
5.3.2 Personnel reference mode test 
Figure 43 shows the comparison of the historic time series of the total staff in the industry 
and the behavior produced by the model. Total staff (red line) represents the reference mode. 
Blue line shows the simulated behavior. The visual comparison shows quite good fit between 
simulated and reference graphs. The calculated correlation coefficient (R
2
) is equal to 0.90 and 
RMSE divided by run average is 2.8%. Statistical tests also prove that graphs have a very close 
fit.  
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Figure 43: Personnel reference mode test 
Slight differences between the reference mode and the simulated behavior are due to the 
fact that reference data shows the results per year ended while simulated behavior also shows the 
accumulation process of total staff during the year. The total staff, represented as a stock, is 
demonstrating a goal seeking behavior. Stock is constantly seeking for the desired level of the 
staff. The goal changes every year based on the financial results and on the pressure coming 
from regulations to adjust staff levels. Generally, the fit is close enough to conclude that the 
model represents the real situation of the personnel development over the historic period well.  
5.3.3 Financial sector reference mode tests 
Figures 44-46 show the comparison of the key financial indicators’ data with the 
simulated behavior. Figures 44-45 show the results of the tests conducted comparing operating 
income and expenses, respectfully.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Operating income reference mode test 
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Red line represents the reference mode while blue line shows the simulated behavior. 
Both graphs show rather close fit. The calculated correlation coefficient (R
2
) for operating 
income simulation against real data is equal to 0.99 and RMSE divided by run average is 1.1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Operating expenses reference mode test 
 
The calculated correlation coefficient (R
2
) for operating expenses simulation against real 
data is equal to 0.95 and RMSE divided by run average is 1.9%. Statistical testing, therefore, also 
proves that both operating income and operating expenses have a close fit. 
Figure 46 shows the comparison of the CIR data with the simulated behavior. The final 
industry indicator also shows rather close fit between the data and the simulation results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: CIR reference mode test 
 
The calculated correlation coefficient (R
2
) for CIR simulation against real data is equal to 
0.98 and RMSE divided by run average is 1.88%. 
Table 3 summarizes all the key indicators which were used to test the model against the 
real historic data.  
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Theil’s Inequality Statistics 
  R
2
 RMSPE Um Us Uc 
AuM 0.99490 0.01333 0.03482 0.71975 0.24543 
Total staff 0.89651 0.02820 0.15467 0.05805 0.78729 
Operating income 0.99486 0.01105 0.04153 0.55635 0.40212 
Operating expenses 0.95095 0.01930 0.16723 0.01137 0.82141 
CIR 0.98110 0.01886 0.13954 0.38594 0.47452 
 
Table 3: Summarized behavior pattern test results12 
 
Additionally to the key correlation indicators (R
2
 and RMSE) described above, Theil’s 
inequality statistics were calculated. The Theil inequality statistics (Theil, 1966 as cited in 
Sterman, 2000 p. 875) provide an “elegant decomposition of the error” by splitting the MSE into 
three components: bias (U
m
), unequal variation (U
s)
, and unequal covariation (U
c)
. The tests 
results show (see Figure 3) that bias error, which is considered to be the most worrisome, is 
extremely low. The error for most of the tested variables arises from the co-variation (Total staff, 
operating expenses and CIR) and unequal variation (AuM and operating income). When unequal 
variation dominates the RMSE, the model simulation and the historic data is highly correlated, 
but the variation differs around the mean. When unequal covariation dominates mean square 
error, the variations comes from the point by point comparison. No major concerns regarding the 
eligibility of the model came from the statistical analysis.   
5.4 Structure-behavior tests 
Gaps in the available data often can mean that it is not possible to evaluate the 
importance and strength of some key relationships or formulations by statistical means (Sterman 
2000).  Structure-behavior tests analyze the importance of parts of the structure by examining 
whether anomalous behavior is being produced when the relationship is cut or modifies. Three 
structure-behavior tests were conducting: no regulatory pressure test, no current policies and no 
investments.  
5.4.1 No regulatory pressure 
One of the research questions which this paper aims at answering is “what is the effect of 
new regulations on Swiss private banking?”, therefore, it was considered important to test how 
                                                 
12
 Formulas used to calculate metrics presented in Table 3 are listed in the Appendix D.  
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the system would behave if there were no external impulse coming from the governmental 
regulations. To test this structure, regulatory pressure was set to be equal to 0 for all analyzed 
period (as appose to regulatory pressure being 0 when time is < 2009 and 100 when time is 
>2009). The simulation results are presented in the Figures 47-50.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the tests meet the predicted behavior. On the graphs, two periods are 
shown: 1 – before new regulations were introduced and 2 – after. All graphs show that when 
testing period 1, graphs are identical. This just provides additional confidence that no errors 
occur in the structure of the model. The period two shows the difference between model’s 
behavior under normal against no regulatory pressure conditions.  
If Swiss private banks would continue accepting undeclared money and no additional 
outflow due to clientele loss would occur, undeclared off-shore AuM (as shown on Figure 47) 
would have remained relatively stable with a slightly increasing trend. The declared off-shore 
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AuM would also remain relatively stable if no additional inflow due to declaration were to 
happen (as shown in Figure 48).  
On the cost side, the total staff level would have decreased almost to its initial level (in 
the beginning of the analyzed period) as shown in Figure 49. The difference in two graphs which 
occurs as a result of the regulatory pressure starts in the end of 2009 and not in the beginning of 
2009 as in the case of AuM. The effect of the regulatory pressure on personnel is delayed. First 
of all, there is a perception delay between the time financial results are being compiled by the 
financial departments and the time needed for decision makers to adjust the desired personnel 
level. The hiring process is another delay which explains delayed effect. As a result of the lower 
personnel level, staff related costs would accordingly be at a lesser level.  
Figure 51 shows how the new regulations affect the gross profits. The graph shows that if 
no regulations were introduced, the market would recover from the economic downturn in the 
beginning of 2010. Starting from that point, profits would have been back to a positive growth 
trend.  
5.4.2 No current policies 
To test how the market would behave if the market players did not implement cost 
reduction policies, B1 and B2 loops will be cut.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 51: Causal loop diagram with the suggested policies 
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To cut the loops, the effect of perceived profit on desired staff level is set to be equal to 1, 
which means that there is no effect of profit on the desired level of back office staff or 
administrative expenses. The results of the simulation are presented in the Figures 52-55.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simulation results show that current policies implemented by the market players have 
had only marginal effect on the overall market performance. The total staff level has been 
reduces (as shown in Figure 52) as well as personnel related costs. However, cost reduction 
policies did not have any major effect on the assets under management. This means that although 
private banks were making certain investments during the analyzed period, the level of 
investments was only as large as it was required to keep the quality of the products and services 
at its initial level. The ratio between reference investments and actual investments was equal to 
one during the historic period. We can conclude that the investments related loops did not have 
any major influence on the model during the analyzed period.  
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Figure 52: Total staff under normal and no current policies 
conditions 
Figure 53: Total AuM under normal and no current policies 
conditions 
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5.4.3 No investments 
To test how the model would behave if decision makers had not invested in product and 
service quality during the analyzed period at all, the link between reference investments and 
actual investments is cut. This means that there are no additional investments made during 2006-
2011. The simulation results are presented in the Figures 56-59.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simulation shows that if no additional investments in product and service quality 
were made during the analyzed period, the product service and quality would show a goal- 
seeking behavior towards 0. The clients’ retention rate, consequently, would also be decreasing 
at a steady pace. Total AuM would be at a lower than under the normal conditions level. And 
starting from 2009 (when the new regulations come into force and Swiss private banking starts 
losing clients), the decay of the total AuM would be much steeper than under normal conditions. 
Gross profits, as a consequence, would also be at a lower level.  
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Figure 58: Total AuM under normal and no investments 
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5.5 Parameter sensitivity tests 
According to Barlas (1994 p. 191), “Behavior sensitivity test consists of determining 
those parameters to which the model is sensitive, and asking whether the real system would 
exhibit a similar high sensitivity to the corresponding parameter”. In other words, sensitivity 
testing is the process of changing underlying assumptions about the value of constants in the 
model and analyzing the resulting output.  Manual sensitivity testing involves assigning different 
values of constants and simulating one by one in order to get a spread of output values. Vensim 
has a special function which allows conducting sensitivity simulations automatically. In the 
Monte Carlo simulation or multivariate sensitivity simulation (MVSS) constants can be sampled 
over a range of values while outputs are stored for later analysis.   
In the Swiss private banking model, there are several variables which have an important 
effect on the market behavior which are external. Therefore, it is important to test the system’s 
reaction to the change in these variables and compare the simulation results with expectations 
about how the real market would react to the change in those variables. A number of parameters 
were tested, however, only the most important results are presented.  
5.5.1 Sensitivity to performance and currency effect value 
Performance and currency effect has an important effect on the size of the market (AuM). 
It is expected that sensitivity of the market to this parameter is very high. In the model, 
performance and currency effect was represented as an external variable with historic data being 
its input. To test the sensitivity of this variable we set it to be a constant in the range of [-0.3 – 
0.3]. The results of the simulation are shown in the Figures 60-61.  
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 The simulation results show that the model is very sensitive to the change in performance 
and currency effect. In the Figure 60 it can be seen that the amplitude between the maximum 
point of the AuM and the minimum is substantial. In the graphs, colors indicate the confidence 
bound which are computed at each point in time by ordering and sampling all the simulation 
runs. It can be seen from the graph that most of the tested simulations would be within the light 
blue color boundaries. Gross profits show the same trend as AuM with slightly lower sensitivity 
amplitude.  
This sensitivity test shows that both AuM and gross profits react significantly to the 
values that performance and currency effect takes. The shape of the behavior, however, does not 
change when different parameter values are taken. This indicates the robustness of the model.  
5.5.2 Sensitivity to declaration implementation delay 
The second sensitivity test examines the sensitivity of the model to declaration 
implementation delay. In the model the implementation delay is set to be an estimated constant. 
Therefore, it is important to test the impact of the variation in this variable on the behavior of the 
model. To test this factor, a list of possible values that an implementation delay can take was 
created. The values are set to vary between 0.0001 and 10 years. The list of declaration 
implementation delay values used in this sensitivity test is presented in the Appendix E. The 
results of the test are presented in Figures 62-65.  
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 The results of the test show that both, declared and undeclared AuM stocks are very 
sensitive to the change in the declaration implementation delay time, which means that both off-
shore AuM stocks react significantly to the values that the declaration implementation delay 
takes. The total AuM consolidates not only off-shore DAuM and UAuM, but also on-shore AuM 
which is not affected by the declaration delay in any way. The sensitivity of the total AuM is 
lower than of the each off-shore stocks separately. Gross profits profit show even higher 
robustness to the change in declaration implementation delay. These results also seem to 
represent the real world situation fairly well.  
5.5.3 Sensitivity to time to hire new CRMs 
The third sensitivity test aims at testing the model’s robustness to a change in time to hire 
new CRMs. In the model, time to hire new CRMs is a constant which was estimated by the 
market players during the interviews. To test this factor, a list of possible values that hiring delay 
can take was created and imported in Vensim using Monte. The list of the inputs tested is 
presented in Appendix E. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 66-69. 
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The simulation results show that New CRM stock is very sensitive to the variations in the 
time needed to hire new CRMs. The amplitude of the oscillations increases with the increase in 
the time to hire and decreases when the time to hire is reduced. The experienced CRMs stock 
reacts more robustly to the change in the time to hire new CRMs value than the New CRM stock 
does. The total personnel expenses and gross profit have a rather low sensitivity to the change 
time to hire new CRMs. From this test it can be concluded that when it comes to the consolidated 
industry level, increase or decrease in time to hire new CRM has only marginal effect on the 
profitability of the market 
In sum, Chapter 5 aimed at analyzing the model in order to build trust in its structure and 
prove that the model produces the right behavior for the right reasons. The tests did not reveal 
any inconsistencies.   
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Figure 66: New CRM sensitivity to a change in time to hire 
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6 Chapter 6: Scenario analysis and new policies 
After the model has been tested and no major flaws were revealed, it was concluded that 
it can act as a tool for the development of the Swiss private banking industry forecasts over the 
short to mid- term future (2012-2018). For the exogenous variables that are not part of the 
internal model dynamics, various scenario analyses will be conducted. As it was demonstrated in 
the Chapter 5, the model is very sensitive to the change in performance and currency effect 
values. Therefore, the model will be simulated under various scenarios of the performance and 
currency effects from 2012 to 2018. In this chapter the analysis of the simulation results in a 
neutral performance and currency environment will be presented. The results of the simulations 
under favorable and unfavorable performance and currency effect scenarios are presented in the 
Appendixes F and G, respectfully. Finally, this chapter will suggest policies which could help 
private banks to increase their profitability in a longer run.  
6.1 Outlook under neutral performance and currency environment  
To examine the net new money flows and the behavior of the market over the forecast 
period under neutral performance and currency effect conditions, the model is simulated with 
forecasted performance and currency effect being set to 0.  
6.1.1 Assets under management  
The simulation results show that assets under management (as shown in Figure 70) after 
continuous downwards trend during 2009-2013 will stabilize in 2014 and will show a sluggish 
positive growth from then on.  
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Figure 71: Forecasted declared and undeclared AuM under 
neutral performance and currency effect conditions 
Figure 70: Forecasted total AuM under neutral performance 
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The explanation for this can be found by looking into the behavior of the declared and 
undeclared AuM stocks. Figure 70 shows that off-shore UAuM will be showing a goal-seeking 
behavior and approach 0 in 2015. After the Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital (described in details in chapter 3) was adopted, Swiss private banks were 
less willing to accept new undeclared assets and, therefore, the inflow of the undeclared AuM is 
gradually decreasing towards 0. In the meanwhile, the declaration process, which was also the 
outcome of the new regulatory environment, accelerated and resulted in increased flow of AuM 
from undeclared to declared assets stock.  
The time it takes for all the assets in UAuM stock to move to the DAuM stock depends 
on the declaration implementation delay. In this simulation it is assumed that the transition 
process happens gradually. However, the transition process can happen much faster if the 
pressure from local tax authorities, or clients’ perception of the pressure from tax authorities, 
would suddenly increase. To test how the model would behave under different declaration 
implementation delay values a special interface was developed (as shown in Appendix J). Using 
this interface PwC specialists and the market players may test different scenarios by changing 
values of the variables which are under uncertainty.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 72 shows the simulated forecast for the development of the attractiveness of Swiss 
private banking for declared and undeclared clients (undeclared clients here refer to those clients 
who had their assets initially undeclared in the beginning of the analyzed period). The results of 
the simulation show that the attractiveness for declared clients is expected to increase over the 
forecast period. The safe haven reputation, which is one of the key components of the function 
defining attractiveness, is expected to gain strength in lights of the increasing uncertainty in 
Selected Variables
90
82.5
75
67.5
60
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Time (Year)
D
m
n
l
Attractivness of Swiss PB for declared client : Normal conditions run
Attractivness of Swiss PB for undeclared clients : Normal conditions run
Figure 72: Forecasted attractiveness of Swiss PB for 
declared and undeclared clients Figure 73: Forecasted retention rate 
Retention rate
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Time (Year)
D
m
n
l
Retention rate : Normal conditions run
64 
 
some regions of the world. Uncertainty in the euro zone area, the simmering political tensions in 
the Middle East and, the recent nationalization of privately owned companies in several Latin 
American countries is expected to add value to the perception of Switzerland as a safe haven for 
the off-shore clients (PwC, 2013).  
The attractiveness of Swiss private banking for undeclared (also formerly undeclared) 
clients, however, will continue to fall. The major reason behind the negative trend is the loss of 
perceived secrecy. Decreasing attractiveness for undeclared clients will continue having a 
negative effect on the client retention rate as shown in Figure 72. The falling retention rate can 
be considered one of the major concerns which private banks should address in order to decrease 
the outflow of the assets to competing private banking centers.  
In sum, the new money inflow generated as a result of increasing attractiveness for new 
declared off-shore clients (in particularly in the areas with political and economic uncertainties) 
will still outweigh the money outflow. The total level of AuM will reach its bottom when the 
AuM outflow due to the declaration process will peak. As soon the transition towards compliant 
business model is over, Swiss private banking industry will be able to recover and produce 
robust net new money inflows.  
6.1.2 Revenues  
Figures 74-75 show the development of the operating income over the forecast period 
under the neutral performance and currency effect conditions. First, the model is simulated with 
stable gross margins. 
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Figure 74: Forecasted Fee and commission income and 
trading and interest income under current gross margin 
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The results of the simulation indicate that fee and commission income are expected to 
follow the same trend as the AuM. The trading and interest income have external inputs to our 
model. The current simulation was run under favorable trading and interest income conditions. 
Different scenarios can be testing using the developed interface in the model.  
Industry experts, however, believe that gross margins won’t remain unchanged over the 
forecast period. It is expected that unfortunately for the private banks and, for the industry as a 
whole, gross margins will decrease in the future. According to PwC (2013), the intensified 
competition among the banks within the industry as well as increased competition with other off-
shore private banking centers and private banking centers in the respective off-shore clients’ 
home countries will continue pressuring the fees. Moreover, on average tax-compliant client 
assets generate lower margins for banks compared to undeclared assets. Therefore, at the same 
time to the declaration process, the average margins on AuM will be further pushed down. In 
light of such an unfavorable forecast for the development of the gross margins, we run the 
simulation to examine behavior of the operating income under declining gross margins 
conditions (Figures 76-77). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The simulation results show that decreasing fees not necessarily should be considered as 
unfavorable condition. In fact, the simulation shows that when lower fees are set, the total 
operating income level in the industry would be even slightly higher than under current 
conditions. On the one hand, decreased fees means lower gross margins applied on the assets. On 
the other hand, reduced fees increase client retention rate and, therefore, reduce the AuM 
outflow. This consequently means the higher level of the total AuM on which margin is applied.  
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6.1.3 Costs  
The costs which private banks experience will continue being heavily affected by the 
regulatory environment. New regulatory requirements such as FATCA, as well as adapting to 
MiFID II will require private banks to make additional investments in human capital and IT.  
Regulatory changes will force Swiss private banks to invest further in the regulatory, 
legal and compliance areas. This means that banks will be forced to adjust the desired level of 
back and middle office staff level further up. Adapting to new regulatory standards will require 
hiring additional staff with specific expertise in compliance, tax and legal matters. Moreover, 
additional investments will be needed in the education of employees. Overall, adopting new 
regulations will increase the total level of back office staff and consequently, back office 
personnel related costs. The total administrative costs will also continue growing due to required 
investments in IT. Figures 78-79 show the results of the simulation when future costs related to 
new regulatory environment are taken into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both, personnel and administrative costs are forecasted to show further increase, mainly, 
as a result of the additional costs associated with new regulatory environment. Costs related to 
new regulations do not add any value to the quality of products and services which private banks 
provide and therefore, do not add to generating additional revenues.  
6.1.4 Profitability 
Figures 80-81 show the simulation results for the development of the profitability of the 
Swiss private banking industry over the forecast period. The simulation showed that no 
significant improvement in the profitability of the industry is to be expected in the short-midterm 
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future. Although the revenues are expected to start recovering in a midterm, the costs related to 
new regulations will counterbalance the increase in revenues. As a result, the cost income ratio 
will keep growing and stabilize at the level of 80%. When the value of the expected CIR at the 
end of the forecast period is compared to its initial value, it can be concluded, that the prospects 
for the industry are not favorable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Outlook with the current policies 
There are no doubts in saying that under the forecasts discussed, the prospects for private 
banks may seem challenging. However, as it was concluded in the previous chapter, in response 
to the declining profits, private banks have been implementing measures directed at streamlining 
their operational structure and closing down or disposing of non-profitable operations. It is 
expected that the same trend will continue, and what is more, outsourcing back-office services 
and infrastructure consolidation policies will be getting even more popular.  
To test how the industry would behave when the market players intensify their cost 
reduction policies, we run the simulation assuming that new cost-reduction policies allow 
lowering the level of the back and middle office staff by an average of 6%. Since it would be 
hard to predict what would be the minimum level of the back and middle office personnel 
needed, we introduce a variable called new desired level of back and middle office personnel to 
test the behavior of the model under different policy scenarios. We also add a slider to the 
control panel which allows testing the behavior of the model under different levels of the staff-
reduction policies over the forecast period as shown in Appendix J.  
The simulation results (as shown in Figures 82-83) show that when the personnel 
reduction policies are taken into account, the prospects for the industry look to some extent 
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brighter. The CIR stabilizes at a lower level than when no staff reduction policies are being 
implemented. However, the extent to which the cost-reduction policies can be applied without 
any harm made for the quality of service and products is very limited.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Outlook with the new policies 
Most of the policies which were implemented by the market players in response to the 
declining profits were directed at cost reduction. The revenue side of the profitability equation 
has not been addressed previously. Now, we would like to test how the market would react if the 
market players direct their policies not only at reducing costs, but also at increasing their 
revenues.  
 As it was discussed previously in Chapter 4, the attractiveness of the Swiss private 
banking for off-shore clients depends on the safe haven reputation, secrecy and product and 
service quality. Both, safe haven reputation and secrecy cannot be controlled by the private 
banks. Product and service quality, on the other hand, may be internal.  
Overall, the level of private banking service in Switzerland has been considered high over 
the analyzed period (as estimated by private bankers, at around 80 points out of 100). From the 
trade interviews it was concluded that product and service quality has been always considered to 
be at a relatively high level and therefore, all the investments were directed at maintaining a 
constant level. Now, we would like to test if the product and service quality could be a leverage 
point, which could help Swiss private banks to increase their profitability.  
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Figure 84 shows that the policies which were used by the market players created a 
balancing feedback loops structure (Loops B1 and B2). The green arrows indicate the suggested 
new policy. By linking the profits with investments in product and service quality, a reinforcing 
loop structure is created (R Investments). The reinforcing investments loop (R Investments loop) 
represents the reinforcing structure of the investments – the more market players invest in service 
and products, the higher attractiveness they have on the international market (with a rather long 
delay) and therefore, the higher revenues and the higher profits they will generate. However, 
investments first of all, are an immediate cost, which means that the investments are also a part 
of a balancing Investments costs loop structure.  
Another balancing loop related to investments (B Investments) explains the balancing 
mechanism related to the demand (AuM). As long as the demand increases due to the increased 
investments, there will be a need to increase the variable costs which will result in the decreased 
profits. In the model we introduce a variable which indicates the effect of profits on the indicated 
investments. After additional structure was added to the model, key tests described in Chapter 5 
were repeated in order to obtain confidence in the reliability of the model.  
Figure 84: Causal loop diagram with new policies 
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 Figures 85-90 show the results of the simulation with the new policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the new policy conditions, additional investments result in the increased level of 
service and product quality. The product and service quality is now showing a goal-seeking 
behavior, with the new indicated service and product quality being the goal. As a result of 
increased product and service quality, the attractiveness for both declared and undeclared clients 
also increases. When the attractiveness of Swiss financial center on the global market enhances, 
private banks will be able to attract higher share of the new wealth. Increased attractiveness will 
also imply an improvement in the retention rate. This means that there will be a lower AuM 
outflow to other financial centers and consequently, higher overall level of the managed assets.  
 Figure 89 shows that under new policy conditions AuM would be less affected by the 
new regulations and would recover faster than under no new policy conditions. CIR would also 
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stabilize at a lower level and ever start showing negative exponential growth behavior in the end 
of the forecast period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In sum, this chapter aimed at looking into the prospects of Swiss private banking under 
different scenarios for the development of the performance and currency effect and, gross 
margins. First, the simulation results under no additional policies scenario were analyzed. The 
prospects for industry when no additional policies are implemented are rather worrisome. 
However, when the additional policies that are expected to be implemented by the market 
players are taken into account, the market profitability shows to a certain extent, better results. 
Finally, after the new policies directed at revenue enlargements were tested, it can be concluded 
that towards the end of the forecast period the situation of the banks should start improving. 
After the transition process towards more compliant business model is over, Swiss private 
banking industry should be able to generate robust net new money inflows.  
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Figure 90: AuM under normal and new policy conditions 
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7 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis was to develop a system dynamics model which could 
help the market players and PwC experts to analyze the structural changes in the industry and 
assist in developing the industry forecasts. The SD model was developed in a period of around 
three month. The process of building the model involved thorough desk research and interactive 
trade research.  
The work aimed at identifying the key forces driving the industry behavior by 
representing the structure of the industry in a coherent and consistent way. Swiss private banking 
industry has been always known as a leading off-shore private banking center. However, after 
the economic downturn, the industry has been going through a phase of fundamental change due 
to the new regulations which were put into force. Therefore, the effect of new regulations on the 
market was set to be the main research question. The developed model explains the behavior of 
the market before to the new regulations were introduced and after. The model passed various 
model validation tests and proved to be capable to reproduce the behavior of the real system.   
The key contribution of this work, besides invaluable experience for the author herself, 
includes constructing a model that captures the private banking industry in a structured systemic 
visual representation which includes the time delays, feedback cycles, nonlinearities, stocks and 
flows. The conclusive added value of the model is its ability to produce forecast for the 
development of the key industry indicators under various scenarios. The main academic 
aspiration of the thesis is the proof that system dynamics methodology can be applied for the 
market analysis and forecasting.  
7.1 Key findings 
From the course of developing the model several conclusions could be derived: 
1) First of all, it was concluded that over the period analyzed, the performance of the industry 
has been largely driven by the external factors that Swiss private banks cannot control, such 
as, market performance, currency exchange effects, the reputation of Switzerland being a 
safe haven, changes to banking secrecy and new regulations. The key internal performance 
driver of the industry is the product and service quality. It has remained constant over the 
period under review and therefore, did not have major influence on the behavior of the 
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market. From this, we can conclude that indeed, it is the “not-so-invisible-hand” that is 
driving the industry performance.  
2) New regulations have had a very strong effect on the industry, both on revenues and costs of 
private banks. More rigid tax regulations have resulted in the Swiss private banking industry 
losing its attractiveness for off-shore clients and, increasing AuM outflows. In addition, new 
regulations have triggered the transition towards a more tax-compliant business, causing the 
inflow of undeclared assets to decrease to its minimum. The costs of private banks were 
being increased, primarily in the form of increased compliance and indirect economic effects.   
3) Most of the policies the market players have implemented were directed at cost reduction. 
The simulation results indicate that such policies are effective only to a certain extent and 
were not able to entirely compensate for the slump in revenues.  
4) Lastly, it was concluded that by focusing entirely on cost reduction, Swiss private banks will 
not be able to improve the current situation significantly. It was suggested that by investing  
in service and product quality, Swiss private banks will be able to reduce AuM outflow 
related to the declaration process and maintain higher overall level of the managed assets and 
consequently, higher profitability.  
7.2 Recommendations 
Based on the analysis described in the current paper, several recommendations for private 
banks can be made.  
Standing still is no longer an option: Swiss private banking industry has been largely 
driven by external factors during the period analyzed. For many years factors, such as tax 
benefits, and the reputation of being safe haven were the key success drivers of the industry. 
However, external factors do not support the industry anymore; therefore, there is a need for the 
industry to build on its own strengths. Private banks need to be able to implement effective 
change in response to the changes in the market environment.  
Making clients “stick”: The study revealed that client loss to other private banking 
centers after the declaration process is one of the areas of key concern. Private banks should 
prepare for this and introduce measures directed at increasing clients’ retention rate. Banks 
should focus on keeping the current clients and, their wealth, in by creating more intimate, 
added-value and long-term relationships between CRMs and clients. 
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Exceeding clients’ expectations: Although Swiss private banks have the reputation for 
high quality of products and services, increasing quality further is an area which yields benefits. 
Only by exceeding clients’ expectation in terms of service provided, Swiss private banking 
industry will be able to make the transition period smoother. One of the ways to enhance clients’ 
wealth management experience is by segmenting clients into groups based on clients’ specific 
needs and characteristics. Accompanying investments should be made in human resource.  
Further tightening the belts: If possible, Swiss private banks should intensify their cost-
reduction policies. Outsourcing back office services, infrastructure consolidation, operational 
efficiency, and other cost reduction policies which can be implemented without any harm on the 
overall quality of client experience should be considered. It can be expected that by improving 
overall service and product quality combined with delivering operational efficiency and cutting 
costs, Swiss private banks resume the positive trend in the industry’s profitability in the midterm 
future.  
7.3 Implications  
  The suggested policies might face a number of implementation obstacles which should be 
discussed. In this study, we were looking into the private banking industry as a whole and the 
size of the banks and their investments capabilities per unit were not taken into account. 
Therefore, the organizational feasibility of suggested policy can be questioned. Organizational 
feasibility is defined as the extent to which the proposed policy can be met by an individual 
organization. It is expected that some of the private banks will not be able to obtain the desired 
level of cost reduction which will be needed in order to generate the funds needed or investments 
in the product and service quality. This means that the industry might experience further 
consolidation processes.   
7.4 Limitations and further research 
 The main limitations to this research were related to the time boundaries given. The private 
banking industry contains an intimidating degree of dynamic complexity. Given the three to four 
month time for researching the industry, developing and validating the model and producing the 
report, there are several areas in which a longer study could lead to significant improvements.   
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First of all, the model consists of endogenous and exogenous variables. Implications of the 
new regulations were set to be the key focus of this research, and therefore, a number of variables not 
directly related to this issue were considered exogenous.  
Gross margin was used as an exogenous variable, while it could be modeled 
endogenously. Also, in the financial sector only the net income structure was taken into account. 
Including the whole balance sheet and developing more detailed financial structure of the 
industry would allow more precise testing of investments-related policies. Another area for 
further research could be in the expended representation of the personnel structure. For instance 
in this paper, it was assumed that the labor market is unlimited and there is no lack of 
experienced employees in the Swiss private banking sector. In reality, there is strong competition 
for experienced and high quality personnel.  
Another limitation which should be mentioned is related to the gaps in available data. 
Although there are many published studies which analyze Swiss private banking sector, most of 
them focus only on key indicators. A number of variables had therefore, to be estimated. If 
similar research would have been conducted for a specific bank, more detailed data would have 
been available and more precise assumptions could have been made. Furthermore, the study of 
Helvea SA (2009) was used as a main source for making the split for declared and undeclared 
off-shore assets. If more recent studies on the declaration process were available, the results of 
the simulations were more precise.  
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Appendix A: Equation list  
Name Equation Units 
Accrual of gross 
income Gross profit  CHF/Year 
Accrual of taxes IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse2>0, (Annual tax on profit*Cum gross income), 0 )  CHF/Year 
Actual effect on 
desired level of B&M 
office 
DELAY INFORMATION ( 
  "Indicated effect on desired level of B&M office", 1, 1)  Persons 
Admin expenses Admin expenses per year (Time)  CHF/Year 
Admin expenses per 
year 
( 
 [(2006,0)-(2016,3e+009)],(2006,1.2975e+009),(2007,1.53227e+009),(2008,1.88932e+009 
),(2009,1.92557e+009),(2010,2.43092e+009),(2011,1.68793e+009),(2012,1.7638e+009 
),(2013,1.964e+009),(2014,2.164e+009),(2015,2.364e+009),(2016,2.664e+009))  CHF/Year 
Annual tax on profit 0.1  1/Year 
Attractiveness for 
declared clients ratio Attractiveness of Swiss PB for declared client/Reference attractiveness for declared clients  Dmnl 
Attractiveness for 
undeclared clients 
ratio Attractiveness of Swiss PB for undeclared clients/Reference attractiveness for undeclared clients  Dmnl 
Attractiveness of 
Swiss PB for 
declared client 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<2012, Importance of safe haven reputation*Safe haven reputation 
(Time)+(1-Importance of safe haven reputation)*Swiss service and product quality 
 , Importance of safe haven reputation*Forecasted safe haven reputation(Time 
)+(1-Importance of safe haven reputation)*Swiss service and product quality 
 )  Dmnl 
Attractiveness of 
Swiss PB for 
undeclared clients 
IF THEN ELSE(Time<2012, Safe haven reputation(Time)*Importance of safe haven 
reputation+Importance of secrecy*Perceived secrecy + Swiss service and product quality *(1-
Importance of secrecy-Importance of safe haven reputation) , Forecasted safe haven 
reputation(Time)*Importance of safe haven reputation + Importance of secrecy*Perceived 
secrecy+Swiss service and product quality *(1-Importance of secrecy-Importance of safe haven 
reputation) ) 
  
 
Dmnl 
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Name Equation Units 
 
AuM to declare per 
year 
 
IF THEN ELSE("Off-shore UAuM">0, "Initial off-shore UAuM"*Declaration rate per year 
 , 0 ) 
 
 CHF/Year 
AuM under 
consideration to 
repatriate SMOOTH(Declaration rate, Consideration delay)  CHF/Year 
Average time to pay 
taxes 0.5  Year 
Avg AuM per client 5000000  CHF/Persons 
Avg CRM 
effectiveness (SMOOTH(Regulations effect on effectiveness, Implementation period ))*Initial CRM effectiveness  person/person 
Avg IR effectiveness 85  person/person 
Avg layoff time 0.5  Year 
Avg time of B&M in 
banking 4  Years 
Avg time to create a 
clients portfolio 1  Year 
B&M office layoff 
rate IF THEN ELSE(Back office gap<0, (Back office gap/Avg layoff time) , 0 )  person/Year 
B&M office quitting 
rate B&M office/"Avg time of B&M in banking"  person/Year 
B&M office 
INTEG ( 
 "B&M office hiring rate"-"B&M office layoff rate"-"B&M office quitting rate" 
, 
  16010)  Persons 
B&M reduction 
policy switch 0  Dmnl 
B&M office hiring 
rate  IF THEN ELSE(Back office gap>0, Back office gap/"Time to hire B&M office" , 0 )  person/Year 
Back office gap Desired level of B&M office-"B&M office"  person 
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Name Equation Units 
Change in 
investments Investments gap/TIME STEP 
 
CHF/Year/Ye
ar 
Change in reference 
investments Reference investments*"Change in reference investments (%)" 
 
CHF/Year/Ye
ar 
Change in reference 
investments (%) 0.02  Dmnl 
Change in Swiss 
service and product 
quality Service and product quality gap/Quality adjustment time  Dmnl/Year 
CIR Total operating expenses/Total operating income  Dmnl 
CIR ref 
( [(0,0)-(2012,10)],(2006,0.577),(2007,0.591686),(2008,0.554029),(2009,0.638465 
),(2010,0.7202),(2011,0.730824),(2012,0.745371))  Dmnl 
CIR ref1 CIR ref (Time)  Dmnl 
Consideration delay 0.5  Year 
Cost per employee 
( [(2006,0)-(2018,250000)],(2006,213761),(2007,233000),(2008,245000),(2009,229000 
),(2010,220000),(2011,213000),(2012,214000)) 
 
CHF/person/Y
ear 
CRM average time in 
banking 8  Years 
CRM quitting 
information delay 1  Year 
Cum admin expenses 
INTEG ( 
 Admin expenses-Reset admin expenses, 
  0)  CHF 
 
Cum fee and 
commission income  
INTEG ( 
 Fee and commission income-Reset cum fee and commission income, 
  0)  CHF 
Cum gross income 
INTEG ( 
 Accrual of gross income-Reset earnings before tax,  5.776e+009)  CHF 
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Name Equation Units 
Cum personnel 
expenses 
NTEG ( 
 Personnel expenses-Reset personnel expenses, 
  0)  CHF 
Cum trading and 
interest income INTEG ( Trading and interest income-Reset trading and interest income,  0)  CHF 
DAuM loss due to 
declaration AuM under consideration to repatriate*(1-Retention rate)  CHF/Year 
DAuM loss rate due 
to wealth 
lost/spending Initial off-shore DAuM*"DAuM loss/spending"  CHF/Year 
DAuM loss/spending 0.065  1/Year 
Declaration 
implementation delay 6  Year 
Declaration rate IF THEN ELSE("Off-shore UAuM">0, AuM to declare per year , 0)  CHF/Year 
Declaration rate per 
year 
 SMOOTH(IF THEN ELSE( Regulatory pressure=0, 0 , Indicated declaration rate per year 
), Declaration implementation delay)  1/Year 
Delay of moving 
money out 0.1  Year 
Desired level of 
Experienced CRM Total clients/Avg CRM effectiveness  person 
Desired level of 
Experienced IR Total clients/Avg IR effectiveness  person 
Desired level of 
B&M office 
IF THEN ELSE("B&M reduction policy switch"=0,  (("Reference desired level of B&M office" 
*Effect of income ratio on staff reduction policies)+"Actual effect on desired level of B&M office" 
 ) , IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, (("Reference desired level of B&M office"*Effect of income ratio on 
staff reduction policies 
)+"Actual effect on desired level of B&M office" 
 ) , "New desired level of B&M office (policy measure1)" ) )  Persons 
Effect of 
attractiveness on 
DAuM gain rate 
WITH LOOKUP ( Attractiveness for declared clients ratio,  ([(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0.0964912),(0.0550459,0.114035),(0.152905,0.122807),(0.232416,0.140351),(0.342508,0.2105
26),(0.415902,0.219298),(0.544343,0.298246),(0.672783,0.447368),(0.801223,0.631579),(0.83792,0.70  Dmnl 
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Name Equation Units 
1754),(0.905199,0.859649),(1,0.991228),(1.1,1.23684),(1.21101,1.38596),(1.33333,1.55263),(1.40061,1
.68421),(1.46177,1.72807),(1.5474,1.77193),(1.61468,1.79825),(1.65749,1.80702),(1.69419,1.83333),(1
.7737,1.86842),(1.88379,1.91228),(1.98165,1.91228) )) 
Effect of 
attractiveness on 
retention rate 
 WITH LOOKUP ( 
 Attractiveness for undeclared clients ratio, 
  ([(0,-0.009)-(2,2)],(0,0),(0.0978593,0.0526798),(0.232416,0.105548),(0.342508 
,0.184211),(0.422018,0.263158),(0.501529,0.333333),(0.617737,0.429825),(0.740061 
,0.552632),(0.831804,0.675439),(0.9,0.789474),(1,0.947368),(1.1,1.08772),(1.2 
,1.19298),(1.3,1.35088),(1.40061,1.45614),(1.46177,1.53509),(1.5474,1.66667 
),(1.61468,1.73684),(1.65749,1.75439),(1.69419,1.77193),(1.7737,1.78947),(1.88379 
,1.80702),(2,1.81579) ))  Dmnl 
Effect of 
attractiveness on 
UAuM gain rate 
WITH LOOKUP ( Attractiveness for undeclared clients ratio,  ([(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0),(0.0978593,0.0526798),(0.232416,0.105548),(0.342508,0.184211),(0.422018,0.263158),(0.5
01529,0.333333),(0.617737,0.429825),(0.740061,0.552632),(0.831804,0.675439),(0.9,0.789474),(1,0.94
7368),(1.1,1.08772),(1.2,1.19298),(1.3,1.35088),(1.40061,1.45614),(1.46177,1.53509),(1.5474,1.66667),
(1.61468,1.73684),(1.65749,1.75439),(1.69419,1.77193),(1.7737,1.78947),(1.88379,1.80702),(2,1.8157
9) ))  Dmnl 
Effect of gross profit 
on indicated 
investments 
WITH LOOKUP ( 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time>2013, Policy gross profit ratio, 1 ), 
  ([(1,0)-(2,2)],(1,1.29825),(1.0948,1.31579),(1.1,1.29825),(1.2,1.34211),( 
1.3,1.38596),(1.4,1.47368),(1.5,1.62281),(1.6,1.77193),(1.7,1.87719),(1.8,1.94737 
),(1.9,1.99123),(2,1.99123) ))  Dmnl 
Effect of income 
ratio on staff 
reduction policies 
WITH LOOKUP ( Perceived net income ratio,  ([(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,0.921053),(0.0550459,0.921053),(0.152905,0.921053),(0.232416,0.921053),(0.342508,0.92982
5),(0.415902,0.921053),(0.544343,0.929825),(0.672783,0.95614),(0.801223,0.964912),(0.83792,0.9736
84),(0.868502,0.973684),(0.93578,0.982456),(1,0.991228),(1.07645,1.35965),(1.21101,1.66667),(1.333
33,1.79825),(1.40061,1.81579),(1.41284,1.85965),(1.46177,1.83333),(1.5474,1.85965),(1.61468,1.8859
6),(1.65749,1.89474),(1.69419,1.89474),(1.7737,1.89474),(1.88379,1.89474),(1.98165,1.89474) ))  Dmnl 
Effect of investments 
ratio on indicated 
service and product 
quality 
WITH LOOKUP 
 ( 
 Investments ratio, 
  ([(0,0)-(2,1.25)],(0.0978593,0.0964912),(0.232416,0.105263),(0.342508,0.149123 
),(0.422018,0.210526),(0.501529,0.254386),(0.617737,0.429825),(0.740061,0.640351 
),(0.831804,0.754386),(0.9,0.868421),(1,1),(1.06422,1.09868),(1.11315,1.125 
),(1.2,1.15789),(1.3,1.19737),(1.40061,1.22807),(1.46177,1.22807),(1.5474,1.22807  Dmnl 
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Name Equation Units 
),(1.61468,1.22807),(1.65749,1.28289),(1.69419,1.22807),(1.7737,1.22259),(1.88379 
,1.21711),(1.96942,1.21711) )) 
Effect of perceived 
price on retention 
rate 
WITH LOOKUP ( Perceived price ratio,  ([(0,0)-
(2,2)],(0,1.97368),(0.1,2),(0.2,1.97368),(0.3,1.9386),(0.4,1.74561),(0.5,1.57895),(0.6,1.47368),(0.7,1.32
456),(0.8,1.20175),(0.9,1.07895),(1,1),(1.1,0.833333),(1.2,0.649123),(1.3,0.561404),(1.4,0.491228),(1.5,
0.350877),(1.6,0.245614),(1.7,0.149123),(1.8,0.0964912),(1.9,0.0614035),(2,0.0526316) ))  Dmnl 
Expected CRM 
quitting rate SMOOTH(Experienced CRM quitting rate, CRM quitting information delay)  person/Year 
Expected IR quitting 
rate SMOOTH(IR quitting rate, IR quitting information delay)  person/Year 
Experienced CRM 
INTEG ( 
 Transition rate-Experienced CRM quitting rate, 
  3952)  Persons 
Experienced CRM 
gap Desired level of Experienced CRM-Experienced CRM  Persons 
Experienced CRM 
quitting rate 
IF THEN ELSE(Experienced CRM>0, Experienced CRM/CRM average time in banking 
, 0)  person/Year 
Experienced IR gap Desired level of Experienced IR-IR  Persons 
Fee and commission 
income IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, Total AuM*Gross margin (Time) , Total AuM*Forecasted gross margin)  CHF/Year 
Fee and commission 
income ref 
( 
 [(0,0)-(10,10)],(2006,1.2e+010),(2007,1.30946e+010),(2008,1.55616e+010),(2009 
,1.04643e+010),(2010,9.89988e+009),(2011,9.37899e+009),(2012,8.796e+009))  CHF/Year 
Fee and commission 
income ref1 Fee and commission income ref (Time)*1  CHF/Year 
Forecasted cost per 
employee 214000 
 
CHF/person/Y
ear 
Forecasted gross 
margin 0.0065  1/Year 
Forecasted 
performance and 
currency effect (%) 0  1/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Forecasted safe 
haven reputation ([(2012,0)-(2019,90)],(2012,82),(2013,85),(2014,86),(2015,87),(2019,88))  Dmnl 
Front office New CRM + Experienced CRM+IR  Persons 
Gross income in the 
year N-1 
 DELAY INFORMATION ( 
  Gross profit , 1, 5.5e+009)  CHF/Year 
Gross margin 
 ([(2006,0)-(2018,0.009)],(2006,0.00815),(2007,0.0079),(2008,0.0082),(2009,0.0072 
),(2010,0.007),(2011,0.0067),(2012,0.0065),(2013,0.0062),(2014,0.0061),(2015 
,0.0059),(2016,0.0058),(2017,0.0057),(2018,0.0053))  1/Year 
Gross profit Total operating income-Total operating expenses  CHF/Year 
Gross profit ref 
[(0,0)-(2012,9e+009)],(2006,5.776e+009),(2007,6.33915e+009),(2008,8.48973e+009 
),(2009,6.1627e+009),(2010,4.07849e+009),(2011,3.7337e+009),(2012,3.4421e+009 
))  CHF/Year 
Gross profit ref1 Gross profit ref (Time)*1  CHF/Year 
Implementation 
period 3   
Importance of safe 
haven reputation 0.4  Dmnl 
Importance of 
secrecy 0.2  Dmnl 
Income ratio Gross profit/"Gross income in the year N-1"  Dmnl 
Indicated declaration 
rate per year 1  Dmnl 
Indicated effect on 
desired level of B&M 
office IF THEN ELSE( Regulatory pressure>0, 7000, 1)  Dmnl 
Indicated investments Reference investments*Effect of gross profit on indicated investments  CHF/Year 
Indicated service and 
product quality 
 IF THEN ELSE(Investments policy switch=0, Reference service and product quality, IF THEN 
ELSE(Time<2013, Reference service and product quality  , SMOOTH(Reference service and product 
quality*Effect of investments ratio on indicated service and product quality , Investments 
implementation delay ) ))  Dmnl 
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Name Equation Units 
Indicated UAuM gain 
rate Effect of attractiveness on UAuM gain rate*"Reference UAuM gain rate (%)"  Dmnl 
Initial CRM 
effectiveness 70  Dmnl 
Initial off-shore 
DAuM 
SAMPLE IF TRUE( 
 MODULO(Time, Period)<1e-006,"Off-shore DAuM", "Off-shore DAuM")  CHF 
Initial off-shore 
UAuM 
SAMPLE IF TRUE( 
 MODULO(Time, Period)<1e-006,"Off-shore UAuM", "Off-shore UAuM") 
Units: CHF  CHF 
"Initial on-shore 
AuM 
SAMPLE IF TRUE( 
 MODULO(Time, Period)<1e-006,"On-shore AuM" ,"On-shore AuM") 
Units: CHF  CHF 
Investments 
INTEG ( 
 Change in investments, 
  Reference investments)  CHF/Year 
Investments gap Indicated investments-Investments  CHF/Year 
Investments 
implementation delay 3 Year 
Investments policy 
switch 0  Dmnl 
Investments ratio Investments/Reference investments  Dmnl 
IR 
INTEG ( 
 New IR hiring rate-IR quitting rate, 
  3750)  Persons 
IR average time in 
banking 8  Years 
IR quitting 
information delay 1  Year 
IR quitting rate IR/IR average time in banking  person/Year 
Net new money (%) 
 0.03+STEP(0.01, 2007)+STEP(-0.02, 2008)+STEP(-0.01, 2009)+STEP(0.01,2010)+ 
STEP(-0.02, 2012)  1/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Net off-shore DAuM 
change due to 
performance 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, ("Initial off-shore DAuM"*"Performance and currency effect on off-shore 
AuM (%)" 
) , ("Forecasted performance and currency effect (%)"*"Initial off-shore DAuM" 
) )  CHF/Year 
Net off-shore UAuM 
change due to 
performance 
 IF THEN ELSE("Off-shore UAuM">0, (IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, ("Initial off-shore UAuM" 
*"Performance and currency effect on off-shore AuM (%)" 
 ) , ("Forecasted performance and currency effect (%)"*"Initial off-shore UAuM" 
) )) , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Net on-shore AuM 
change due to new 
money Net new money (%)*"Initial on-shore AuM"  CHF/Year 
Net on-shore AuM 
change due to 
performance 
F THEN ELSE(Time<2013, ("Initial on-shore AuM"*"Performance and currency effects (%)" 
) , ("Forecasted performance and currency effect (%)"*"Initial on-shore AuM" 
) ) 
Units: CHF/Year  CHF/Year 
Net profit Gross profit-Accrual of taxes  CHF/Year 
New CRM 
INTEG ( 
 New CRM hiring rate-New CRM quitting rate-Transition rate, 
  988 
  )  Persons 
New CRM hiring rate 
F THEN ELSE(New CRM*"New CRM quitting (%)"<0, 0 , New CRM*"New CRM quitting (%)" 
 )  person/Year 
New CRM quitting 
(%) 0.001  1/Year 
New CRM quitting 
rate= IF THEN ELSE(New CRM*"New CRM quitting (%)"<0, 0 , New CRM*"New CRM quitting (%))"  Persons/Year 
New desired level of 
B&M office (policy 
measure1) 28000  People 
New IR hiring rate 
Expected IR quitting rate+((IF THEN ELSE(Experienced IR gap>0, Experienced IR gap 
, 0 ))/Time to hire new IR)  person/Year 
Off-shore DAuM 
gain rate (%) Reference off-shore DAuM gain rate (%)*Effect of attractiveness on DAuM gain rate  1/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Off-shore DAuM 
gain rate 
Initial off-shore DAuM*"Off-shore DAuM gain rate (%)" CHF/Year 
Off-shore DAuM loss 
rate DAuM loss rate due to wealth lost/spending + DAuM loss due to declaration  CHF/Year 
Off-shore DAuM 
INTEG ( 
 Declaration rate+"Net off-shore DAuM change due to performance"+"Off-shore DAuM gain rate" 
-"Off-shore DAuM loss rate", 
  4.80686e+011)  CHF 
Off-shore UAuM 
gain rate 
 IF THEN ELSE("Initial off-shore UAuM">0, "Initial off-shore UAuM"*"UAuM gain rate (%)" 
 , 0 ) CHF/Year 
Off-shore UAuM loss 
rate UAuM loss to other tax havens+"UAuM loss rate due to wealth lost/spending"  CHF/Year 
Off-shore UAuM 
 INTEG ( 
 "Net off-shore UAuM change due to performance"+"Off-shore UAuM gain rate"-Declaration rate 
-"Off-shore UAuM loss rate", 
  3.48083e+011)  CHF 
On-shore AuM 
INTEG ( 
 "Net on-shore AuM change due to new money"+"Net on-shore AuM change due to performance",  
6.25212e+011)  CHF 
Perceived net income 
ratio SMOOTH3( Income ratio, Profit perception delay)  Dmnl 
Perceived price 
 IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, SMOOTH(Gross margin (Time), Perception delay ) , SMOOTH 
(Forecasted gross margin, Perception delay ))  Dmnl 
Perceived price ratio Perceived price/Reference perceived price  Dmnl 
Perceived secrecy SMOOTH( IF THEN ELSE( Regulatory pressure=0, 100, 0), Regulation perception delay)  Dmnl 
Perception delay 0.2  Year 
Performance and 
currency effect on 
off-shore AuM (%) 
 0.01+STEP(-0.011, 2007)+STEP(-0.3, 2008)+STEP(0.25, 2009)+STEP(-0.02,2010) 
+STEP(-0.02,2011)+STEP(0.091,2012)  1/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Performance and 
currency effects (%) 0.13+STEP(-0.37, 2008)+STEP(0.23, 2009)+STEP(-0.02,2011)  1/Year 
Period 1  Years 
Personnel expenses 
Data Personnel expenses ref (Time)*1  CHF/Year 
Personnel expenses 
IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, Total staff*Cost per employee (Time) , Total staff 
*Forecasted cost per employee )  CHF/Year 
Personnel expenses 
ref 
( 
 [(2006,4e+009)-(2012,8e+009)],(2006,5.28e+009),(2007,6.33172e+009),(2008,7.30875e+009 
),(2009,7.58167e+009),(2010,6.66334e+009),(2011,7.01709e+009),(2012,6.85121e+009 
))  CHF/Year 
Policy gross profit 
ratio Gross profit/Policy reference gross income  Dmnl 
Policy reference 
gross income 3240000000  CHF/Year 
Profit perception 
delay 1  Years 
Quality adjustment 
time 2  Years 
Reference 
attractiveness for 
declared clients INITIAL(Attractiveness of Swiss PB for declared client)  Dmnl 
Reference 
attractiveness for 
undeclared clients INITIAL(Attractiveness of Swiss PB for undeclared clients)  Dmnl 
Reference desired 
level of B&M office  
 DELAY INFORMATION ( 
  "B&M office" , 1, 20000)  person 
Reference 
investments 
INTEG ( 
 Change in reference investments, 
  1.2975e+009  
  )  CHF/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Reference off-shore 
DAuM gain rate (%) 
IF THEN ELSE(Time<2012, 0.15 , 0.09 ) 1/Year 
Reference perceived 
price INITIAL( Perceived price )  Dmnl/Year 
Reference retention 
rate 1  Dmnl 
Reference service 
and product quality INITIAL(Swiss service and product quality)  Dmnl 
Reference UAuM 
gain rate (%) 0.12  1/Year 
Regulation 
perception delay 2.5  Year 
Regulations effect on 
effectiveness IF THEN ELSE(Regulatory pressure=0, 1 , 0.8 )  Dmnl 
Regulatory pressure IF THEN ELSE(Time<2013, IF THEN ELSE( Time<2009, 0, 70) , 100 )  Dmnl 
Reset admin 
expenses 
 IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse>0, (Cum admin expenses/TIME STEP)+Admin expenses 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Reset cum fee and 
commission income 
IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse>0, (Cum fee and commission income/TIME STEP)+Fee and commission 
income 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Reset earnings before 
tax 
 IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse2>0, (Cum gross income/TIME STEP)+Accrual of gross income 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Reset personnel 
expenses 
IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse>0, (Cum personnel expenses/TIME STEP)+Personnel expenses 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Reset trading and 
interest income 
 IF THEN ELSE(Yearly pulse>0, (Cum trading and interest income/TIME STEP)+Trading and interest 
income 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
Retention rate 
 0.9*Reference retention rate*Effect of attractiveness on retention rate+0.1 
*Reference retention rate*Effect of perceived price on retention rate  Dmnl 
Safe haven reputation [(2006,80)-(2011,90)],(2006,85),(2011,80))  Dmnl 
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Name Equation Units 
Service and product 
quality gap Indicated service and product quality-Swiss service and product quality  Dmnl 
Swiss service and 
product quality 
INTEG ( 
 Change in Swiss service and product quality, 
  80)  Dmnl 
Taxes owed INTEG ( Accrual of taxes-Taxes paid,  3.41e+007)  CHF 
Taxes paid Taxes owed/Average time to pay taxes  CHF/Year 
The time step for the 
simulation. TIME STEP  = 0.125  Year 
Time to hire B&M 
office 1  Years 
Time to hire new 
CRM 1  Years 
Time to hire new IR 1  Year 
Total AuM On-shore AuM+"Off-shore UAuM"+"Off-shore DAuM"  CHF 
Total AuM ref 
 [(0,0)-(2012,2e+012)],(2006,1.45398e+012),(2007,1.65754e+012),(2008,1.89775e+012 
),(2009,1.45338e+012),(2010,1.41427e+012),(2011,1.39985e+012),(2012,1.35323e+012 
))  CHF 
Total AuM ref1 Total AuM ref (Time)*1  CHF 
Total clients Total AuM/Avg AuM per client  person 
Total operating 
expenses Personnel expenses +Admin expenses +Investments  CHF/Year 
Total operating 
expenses ref 
 [(0,0)-(2012,2e+010)],(2006,7.875e+009),(2007,9.18603e+009),(2008,1.05468e+010 
),(2009,1.08832e+010),(2010,1.0498e+010),(2011,1.01371e+010),(2012,1.0076e+010 
))  CHF/Year 
Total operating 
expenses ref1 Total operating expenses ref (Time)*1  CHF/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
Total operating 
income 
Fee and commission income+ Trading and interest income  CHF/Year 
Total operating 
income ref 
 [(0,0)-(10,10)],(2006,1.35e+010),(2007,1.55252e+010),(2008,1.90365e+010),( 
2009,1.70459e+010),(2010,1.45765e+010),(2011,1.38708e+010),(2012,1.35181e+010 
))  CHF/Year 
Total operating 
income ref1 Total operating income ref (Time)  CHF/Year 
Total staff B&M office+ Front office  person 
Total staff ref 
 [(0,0)-(10,10)],(2006,24704.3),(2007,27174.8),(2008,29831.6),(2009,33107.8 
),(2010,30287.9),(2011,32944.1),(2012,32015))  Persons 
Total staff ref1 Total staff ref (Time)*1  person 
Trading and interest 
income Trading and interest income per year (Time)  CHF/Year 
Trading and interest 
income per year 
 [(2006,0)-(2018,7e+009)],(2006,1.80047e+009),(2007,2.43063e+009),(2008,3.47495e+009 
),(2009,6.58161e+009),(2010,4.67659e+009),(2011,4.49184e+009),(2012,4.72213e+009 
),(2013,4.922e+009),(2014,5.1022e+009),(2015,5.402e+009),(2016,5.602e+009), 
(2017,5.702e+009),(2018,5.80702e+009))  CHF/Year 
Transition rate 
 IF THEN ELSE(New CRM/Avg time to create a clients portfolio<0,0, New CRM/Avg time to create a 
clients portfolio 
)  Persons/Year 
UAuM gain rate (%) 
SMOOTH(IF THEN ELSE(Regulatory pressure=0, Indicated UAuM gain rate, 0), Declaration 
implementation delay 
 )  1/Year 
UAuM loss rate due 
to wealth 
lost/spending 
 IF THEN ELSE("Off-shore UAuM">0, "Initial off-shore UAuM"*"UAuM wealth loss/spending (%)" 
 , 0 )  CHF/Year 
UAuM loss to other 
tax havens 
 IF THEN ELSE("Off-shore UAuM">0, (SMOOTH( "UAuM loss to other tax havens (%)" 
*"Initial off-shore UAuM" , Delay of moving money out 
  )) , 0 )  CHF/Year 
UAuM loss to other 
tax havens (%) IF THEN ELSE(Regulatory pressure=0, 0.001 , 0.12 )  1/Year 
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Name Equation Units 
UAuM wealth 
loss/spending (%) 0.001  1/Year 
Yearly pulse PULSE TRAIN(2007-TIME STEP, TIME STEP , 1 , 2019 )  Year 
Yearly pulse2 PULSE TRAIN(2007-2*TIME STEP, TIME STEP , 1 , 2019 )  Year 
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Appendix B: Key Vensim functions used in the model 
 
Function Description Syntax 
DELAY INFORMATION  Returns the value of the input 
delayed by the delay time. 
Delay time can be a variable.  If 
delay time is decreasing some 
values of the input will be 
discarded and replaced by more 
recent inputs.  If delay time is 
increasing existing values will 
be held. 
DELAY INFORMATION 
(input, delay time, initial 
value) 
IF THEN ELSE Returns first value (tval) if 
condition (cond) is true and a 
second value (fval) if condition 
is false. Condition must be a 
Boolean expression or variable 
that can be interpreted as 
Boolean (i.e., taking a value of 
0 or 1). Only the value returned 
is evaluated, so the other value 
could be an expression that 
would lead to an error.  
IF THEN ELSE(cond, tval, 
fval)  
INITIAL Returns the value A at initial its 
initial value and does not 
change it during a simulation. 
Initial is used when a variable's 
starting value is needed.  
INITIAL(A) INITIAL value of 
variable 
INTEG  Returns the integral of the rate. 
The initial value is the value of 
the variable on the left-hand 
side of the equation at the 
beginning of the simulation.  
INTEG (rate, initial value) 
PULSE TRAIN Returns 1.0, starting at time 
(start), and lasting for interval 
(width) and then repeats this 
pattern every (tbetween) time. 
0.0 is returned at all other times. 
 If the value of tbetween is 
smaller than width then 1 will 
be returned between start and 
end.  If width is less than or 
equal to TIME STEP the pulses 
will only last one TIME STEP. 
PULSE TRAIN (start, width, 
tbetween, end) 
SAMPLE IF TRUE Returns input when condition is SAMPLE IF TRUE 
98 
 
true, otherwise remains 
constant.  The function initially 
holds constant at the stated 
initial value. This function is 
useful for retaining information 
about a variable's behavior.  
(condition, input, initial value) 
SMOOTH Returns 1
st
 order exponential 
smooth. 
SMOOTH(input, delay time) 
SMOOTH3 Returns 3rd order exponential 
smooth. In the model it is used 
to show more complex 
information delay than 
SMOOTH (E.g. before decision 
makers actually can make 
strategic decision based on 
financial results, information 
about financial results is being 
delayed several times)   
SMOOTH3(input, delay time)  
STEP Returns 0 until the step time and 
then returns height.   
STEP(height, step time) 
WITH LOOKUP  Specifies a nonlinear 
relationship between the input x 
and the output by passing the 
input through a series of x,y 
pairs specified as numbers.  
WITH LOOKUP(x,(l#)) 
 
  
Source: created by the author using Vensim manual’s material. 
  
Appendix C1: Stock and flow diagram of the AuM sector 
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Appendix C2: Stock and flow diagram of the Personnel sector 
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Appendix C3: Stock and flow diagram of the Operating income subsector 
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Appendix C4: Stock and flow diagram of the Operating expenses subsector 
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Appendix C5: Stock and flow diagram of the simplified net income statement 
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Appendix D: Formulas used during the behavior pattern tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sterman, 2000  
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Appendix E: List of sensitivity test inputs 
 
Sensitivity to declaration implementation delay test inputs:    Sensitivity to time to hire new CRM test inputs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Appendix F: Simulation results under unfavorable performance and 
currency conditions  
Figures F1-F8 demonstrate the simulation results under unfavorable performance and 
currency effect conditions. Forecasted performance and currency effect value is set for -5%.  
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Appendix G: Simulation results under favorable performance and 
currency conditions 
Figures G1-G8 demonstrate the simulation results under favorable performance and 
currency effect conditions. Forecasted performance and currency effect value is set for 5%.  
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Appendix J: Control panel  
